BERLIN
– When hostilities flared in Gaza last month, it seemed like the same
old story was repeating itself. The world again witnessed a bloody and
senseless surge of violence between Israel and Hamas, in which the main
victims were innocent civilians maimed and killed on both sides.
Today,
the key confrontation in this power struggle is Syria’s civil war,
where all of the region’s major players are represented either directly
or indirectly, because that is where the battle for regional hegemony
will largely be decided. This much is clear: Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad and his Alawite/Shia power base will not be able to maintain
control against the Sunni majority in the country and the region as a
whole. The only question is when the regime will fall.
When
it does, it will be a major defeat for Iran, not only entailing the
loss of its main Arab ally, but also jeopardizing the position of its
client, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. At the same time, a variant of the Muslim
Brotherhood will come to power in Syria, as has been or will be the
case almost everywhere in the Middle East as a result of the “Arab
Awakening.”
From
Israel’s viewpoint, the rise to power of Sunni political Islam
throughout the region over the past two years will lead to an ambivalent
outcome. While the weakening and rollback of Iran serves Israeli
strategic interests, Israel will have to reckon with Sunni Islamist
power everywhere in its vicinity, leading directly to a strengthening of
Hamas.
The
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots has come at the
expense of secular Arab nationalism and the military dictatorships that
supported it. Thus, the Brothers’ rise has de facto also
decided the internal Palestinian power struggle. With the recent war in
Gaza, the Palestinian national movement will align itself, under Hamas’s
leadership, with this regional development. Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party will be unable to offer much
opposition – all the more so in view of Hamas’s break with Iran
(despite ongoing arms deliveries) a year ago.
This
development most likely means the end of prospects for a two-state
solution, because neither Israel nor Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood
has any interest in it. Hamas and the Brothers reject territorial
compromise, because, for them, a Palestinian state means a Palestine
that incorporates all of Israel.
This
is by no means a tactical position or an expression of political
naiveté. On the contrary, the territorial question has morphed into a
religious one, and has thus fundamentally redefined the conflict.
Hamas
is playing a long game. As long as it lacks the strength to achieve its
more ambitious objectives, its intransigence in no way precludes
negotiations with Israel or even peace treaties, as long as such
agreements advance its long-term goals. But such agreements will produce
only truces of shorter or longer duration, not a comprehensive
settlement that ends the conflict.
The
recent success of Abbas in the United Nations General Assembly –
securing observer-state status for Palestine – will not alter the basic
aspects of this trend. Palestine’s promotion is an alarming diplomatic
defeat for Israel and a demonstration of its growing international
isolation, but it does not imply a return to a two-state solution.
Paradoxically,
the position of Hamas fits the political right in Israel, because it,
too, puts little stock in a two-state solution. And neither the Israeli
left (of which little remains) nor Fatah is strong enough to maintain
the two-state option. For Israel, a future as a bi-national state
entails a high long-term risk, unless the option of a West Bank-Jordan
confederation, lost in the 1980’s, is rediscovered. This is again a
possibility.
Indeed,
after the Assad regime falls, Jordan could prove to be the next crisis
hotspot, which might revive the debate over Jordan as the “real”
Palestinian state. Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank would
then have a different foundation and take on new political significance.
While I do not believe that a West Bank-Jordan confederation could ever
be a viable option, it might be the last nail in the coffin of a
two-state solution.
Along
with Syria, two issues will determine this new Middle East’s future:
Egypt’s path under the Muslim Brotherhood, and the outcome of
confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program and regional role.
The
Egyptian question is already high on the agenda; indeed, it spilled
into the streets after President Mohamed Morsi’s non-violent coup
attempt. Morsi’s timing was remarkable: the day after winning
international acclaim for his successful efforts to broker a truce in
Gaza, he staged a frontal assault on Egypt’s nascent democracy.
The
question now is whether the Brothers will prevail, both in the streets
and by means of Egypt’s new constitution (which they largely wrote). If
they do, will the West withdraw its support for Egyptian democracy in
the name of “stability”? It would be a bad mistake.
The
question of what to do about Iran’s nuclear program will also return
with a vengeance in January, after US President Barack Obama’s second
inauguration and Israel’s general election, and will demand an answer
within a few months.
The
new Middle East bodes poorly for the coming year. But one thing has not
changed: it is still the Middle East, where it is nearly impossible to
know what might be waiting around the corner.
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