By Sikander Hayat
Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state.
As states that came into existence to protect and promote the interests of religious minorities, Israel and Pakistan have more in common than is generally recognized. Their histories overlapped in many ways. As nations in the making, they had to create identities, impose languages, and contend with strange boundaries. While both have consciously avoided theocracy, in both places an initially reluctant orthodox segment has successfully gained disproportionate power.
Pakistan and Israel share the unique heritage of having been created in the aftermath of World War II as religiously defined states. In each case, the new state emerged as the result of a twentieth-century ideological movement, came into existence accompanied by violence, and attracted a large immigrant population. Both met with initial rejection from religious elements who more recently, on second thought, aspired to gain political power. Despite these and many other similarities, the two states have hardly ever been compared.
These differences notwithstanding, the Zionist and Pakistan movements shared much in common, including their timetables, the irreligiosity of their leaders, the novel nature of their nationalist ideas, and the challenge of a minority population gaining political power.
The "love of Zion" goes back to early Judaism but modern political Zionism began with the publication in 1896 of Theodor Herzl's Jewish State; it acquired political reality with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and only at the Biltmore Conference of May 1942 did Jewish nationalists formally declare their intention to establish of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Mr Rehmat Ali Proposed the name of the new country. Pakistan is composed of letters taken from all our homelands- "Indian" and "Asian." That is, Punjab, Afghania (Pakhtunkhwa), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kutch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks -- the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland.
Ironically, the leaders of both these religiously defined national movements were personally irreligious, and some even outspoken atheists. "Even Jews who opposed formal religion saw themselves or at least were seen by others as having a common Jewish culture, with its own literature, language, and modes of social relations." Zionism was not a religious doctrine; pioneers of the Jewish state like David Ben-Gurion were motivated by non-religious socialist ideals, not by messianic dogma. Jewish manual labour, not prayer, was their chosen means. Jinnah was anything but a religious person. Rather, he was known for his aristocratic tastes and lifestyle.
Zionist and Pakistani thinkers both had to cope with the same question: Did their religious community qualify as a nation? How could Jews, dispersed for over two millennia, constitute a single people analogous to the Portuguese or the Chinese? Why should Indians who converted to Islam make up a nation distinct from their non-Muslim neighbours? In short, how could Jews from Berlin and Baghdad or Muslims from Madras and Multan have enough in common to make up a single people?
In reply, Zionists held that history has treated the Jews as a separate and distinct entity and nation. Any realistic solution to the prolonged "Jewish problem" lies not in looking for new rulers but for Jews to become rulers themselves. Similarly, Jinnah held that Muslims are "a nation by any definition."The Muslim League argued that there were historical as well as cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims that neither the passage of time nor interaction could satisfactorily bridge.
Neither was willing to live as a protected or tolerated minority in a post-British dispensation.
Once they came into existence as states, both Pakistan and Israel experienced similar sorts of problems as nations in the making, involving boundaries, migration, language, identity, and the legal order.
Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the happenstance of war and led to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography, for it consisted of west and east wings separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory. Those two halves "were remote from each other in everything from language and high cultural tradition to diet, costume, calendar, standard time and social customs."16 The cession of the east wing in 1971, though very painful, did provide geographic contiguity and national focus to Pakistan.
Between 1948-51, more than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, doubling the Jewish population and drastically altering Israel's cultural map, as most of the new immigrants came from Arab countries. Pakistan's formation was accompanied by the influx of huge numbers of refugees, estimated at fifteen million, the vast majority of whom arrived with little property. Absorbing this refugee population proved a monumental task for both Israel and Pakistan. Besides having to provide for housing, employment, education, and distribution of wealth and opportunities, and having to allow for social and cultural adjustments, each new state had to provide a sense of belonging and national identity. The challenge was heightened in Israel's case by the immigrants' worldwide origins and in Pakistan's by the ethnic diversity of its native population as well as the immigrants from India.
In both countries, few spoke the language that served as official tongue. Hebrew, revived from millennia past as a vernacular, had to be learned by nearly everyone. In many families, parents continued with their diverse mother tongues while Hebrew became the language of the children. Had demographic considerations predominated in Pakistan, Bengali would have been the national language, spoken as it was by more than half of Pakistan's original population. Instead, Urdu -- spoken primarily in the Gangetic belt that lay outside its borders and not the principal language of any province that composed Pakistan -- became the country's official language.
Internal disagreements among both Israelis and Pakistanis are acute. The religious-secular debates are at times extremely intense and eventually could damage the state. Tensions between the Ashkenazi (i.e., Europeans) and the Sephardi (Middle Easterners) has a lesser role but played a crucial role in the defeat of the Labor alignment in 1977. Pakistan was anything but a homogeneous entity at the time of its formation. Establishing a Pakistan identity among a divided population was the primary task of the new state.
Who is a Jew, a Muslim? Who is an Israeli or a Pakistani? What is a Jewish or Islamic state? Both states have struggled to define their core identity. Internal divisions prevent a consensus on the question of who is a Jew or Muslim. As a nation committed to "the ingathering of the exiles," one would expect a general agreement on the Jewish identity. On the contrary, "who is a Jew?" has become among the most controversial and contentious issues in Israel and the passage of time only intensifies the tension. For example, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union led to major disagreements when, on halachic grounds, the religious establishment questioned the Jewish credentials of many immigrants. Because of their questionable Judaism, those who fought and died in defense of the country have at times been refused burial in Jewish cemeteries. Likewise, conversions to Judaism under Conservative or Reform auspices are not accepted in Israel.
Constitutions. In Israel, domestic differences impeded a written constitution; for the same reason, Pakistan had too many of them. Conflict over the role and position of halacha (religious law) in the Jewish State significantly inhibited Israel from enacting a constitution. What began as a compromise British model of not having a written constitution gradually became a Pandora's box. With the growing influence of religious parties, writing a constitution has become more distant than ever. In its five decades, Pakistan has had seven constitutional arrangements -- those of 1935, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1985.
The parallel religious response to the new states holds particular interest. Supporters of the Zionist and Pakistani enterprises came primarily from the secular middle-class and neither intended to create a theocratic polity. Reflecting on the Declaration of Independence, David Ben-Gurion later remarked that it said something that I know conflicts with the Halacha, universal and equal suffrage without distinctions of sex, religion, race or nationality; and this was adopted even though according to the Halacha women do not have equal rights.... We must undoubtedly respect any Jew who is faithful to the Halacha, but the Halacha does not obligate every Jew.
At a press conference on July 4, 1947, just a month before the independence of Pakistan, Jinnah remarked that it was "absurd" to think that Pakistan would be a religious state. On the eve of partition, he categorically told members of the Constituent Assembly,
“You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims --not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”
According to first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world." The recognition of the centrality of Islam in the new state was not aimed at making its Sharia the guiding principal. In the words of Paul Brass,
The League leaders were oriented towards achieving secular political power in a modern constitutional-bureaucratic state structure, in which the sharia would be respected but would not prevent legislatures from acting in a sovereign manner and in which secular political leaders would be dominant in a representative regime. In both their goals and their political skills, the Muslim League leaders were more oriented towards and ultimately more successful in the secular political arena in which the political choices had to be made.
In both cases, religious leaders responded negatively to nationalist demands for a religiously-based state. Orthodox Jewry found Zionism unattractive because it contradicted their view that the Jewish state must be formed by the Messiah and not by some non-observant Zionist mortals. Even today, a substantial body of the Orthodox rejects the state, some going so far as to consort with its enemies. This applies even to government functionaries: a former chief rabbi remains seated and studies a religious text while the audience at an official function sings the national anthem; a deputy mayor of Jerusalem dismisses the Israeli flag as a rag.
The idea of a separate Islamic political entity runs counter to the universal brotherhood preached by Islam; if Islam is the authentic nationality of the Muslims everywhere, then political divisions within the Islamic world can only be temporary. If were Pakistan somehow attained, it would confine the sway and glory of Islam to mere corners of the country, Muslims remaining in India would be weakened, and Pakistan would not be a truly Islamic state. Thus, the principal "opposition to the Pakistan demand and to the Muslim League among Muslims came from that segment of the Muslim elite most concerned with the protection of Islam and Muslim culture, from the ulama." In addition, their opposition had much to do with self-interest; the ulema did not see in the Muslim League and in the Pakistan idea an appropriate leadership position for themselves as the true protectors of Islam and Sharia. They also opposed Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan was an unrealistic goal.
Oddly, some of those initially indifferent or even hostile to a state based on religion latterly became among its most fervent advocates and then ambitious to seize control of it. The non-Zionist Orthodox Jews "soon realized that, in a western style democracy, a determined minority has the power to prevent the government from passing laws that ostensibly threaten their sacred principles." Before long, they became key players in the Zionist Knesset and at times indispensable coalition partners. Once Pakistan was created as a "homeland" for the subcontinent's Muslim minorities, religious elements would inevitably try to take control of it. Besides making Pakistan an Islamic Republic the ulema played a crucial role in the legitimization of military rule. An otherwise powerful dictator like Ayub Khan had to make concessions to the ulema and declare Pakistan an Islamic republic. Democracy has been good to the growing ambitions of the religious, with elections enhancing their strength and influence as rival secular parties are compelled to court and solicit the support of the religious leaders and establishment. Religious activists in both countries want such personal and community functions as marriage, divorce, adoption, conversion, burials, and food and travel regulations to come under religious control.
The year 1977 was a major landmark in the approach to religion in both countries, as unprecedented political changes compelled rulers to be more accommodating to the religious conservatives. The ninth Knesset elections of that year abruptly ended the Labour Party's perpetual domination of Israeli politics and when Menachem Begin became prime minister, he was joined, after a gap of over two decades, by the Agudat Israel, a non-Zionist party.Begin conceded various demands made by the religious establishment that previous Israeli governments had hitherto denied. For example, he gave the National Religious Party control of the coveted education ministry, with its ample financial resources and extensive education network.
Pakistan also underwent serious change in 1977 with the imposition of martial law and the overthrow of Zulfiqar Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled until 1988. In need of ways to legitimize his rule, Zia ul-Haq looked to Islam. Projecting himself as a pious Muslim seeking to promote the cause of Islam, he introduced a series of legislative acts toward this end.
Israelis spend little time publicly discussing Pakistan but are favorably disposed toward the country. The first known Zionist contacts with the Indian sub-continent were with Muslim League rather than Congress leaders: Chaim Weizman met Shaukat Ali in London in January 1931. Israel sees Pakistan as an important Islamic state, a key player in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and a country with nuclear capability. In the public sphere however, relations are not so good.
It is a shame that two countries that were created on the same promise of giving their respective people a homeland where they will be free to practice their religion and create a state where law of their respective religion will reign supreme. They will not be persecuted against by people of Europe in Israel’s case and Hindus of India in Pakistan’s case. In 1947, Pakistan got it’s independence from the British and it’s founding fathers promised to make it an enlightened, modern state where Muslims ( who make up about 98% of the population) will be able to live according to their religious beliefs. Next year, in 1948, a similar promise was made to the people of Israel when it got its own independence from the British. The genesis of both these countries is so similar that you could be forgiven for thinking that these two nations should be the best of friends but that’s where the similarities end. Pakistan has never accepted that the State of Israel exists; on Pakistani passports, all the countries of the worlds are mentioned but for Israel. Israel is Palestine for most of the Pakistanis and must be returned to the Palestinians who are its rightful owners.
But the point I want to make is this: Pakistan must understand that land of Pakistan and Land of Israel have a lot in common than they would like to think,
• people who are in majority in both these countries are the people who believe in the God of Abraham
• who believe in the role of religion in the public life
• who believe in the oneness of God
• who believe in the day of judgement
• who share a reverence for Temple Mount
• who have been persecuted at one time by other ethnicities
• who have been invaded by their larger neighbour immediately after their independence
• who have fought at least three major wars for their survival and to protect their sovereignty and independence
• both are the victim of global media bias
Both countries must acknowledge this common ground especially Pakistan. I must admit that Israel has occupied some areas ( Gaza, West Bank & Golan Heights) which it needs to return but to get to that point , Israel needs help from influential Muslim countries ( Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt) who unlike Iran are not categorically against the existence of Israel.
My particular concern is do with Pakistan, which has no direct dispute with Israel, nor is there a chance for any such eventuality in the near future. There is no reason why Pakistan should not accept Israel and establish a diplomatic presence in Western Jerusalem, the eventual capital of the Israeli state.
There is growing body of opinion in Israel, which wants a settlement based on the original borders of the state of Israel and to facilitate that Pakistan can play a role but to do that first we it needs to become a true friend of Israel because at this moment of crisis Pakistan & Israel must stand up and be counted as two responsible states.
I would like to hear your opinions on this issue and start a debate about this issue. What do you think about this issue? Is it a good idea? Is it a bad idea?
Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state.
As states that came into existence to protect and promote the interests of religious minorities, Israel and Pakistan have more in common than is generally recognized. Their histories overlapped in many ways. As nations in the making, they had to create identities, impose languages, and contend with strange boundaries. While both have consciously avoided theocracy, in both places an initially reluctant orthodox segment has successfully gained disproportionate power.
Pakistan and Israel share the unique heritage of having been created in the aftermath of World War II as religiously defined states. In each case, the new state emerged as the result of a twentieth-century ideological movement, came into existence accompanied by violence, and attracted a large immigrant population. Both met with initial rejection from religious elements who more recently, on second thought, aspired to gain political power. Despite these and many other similarities, the two states have hardly ever been compared.
These differences notwithstanding, the Zionist and Pakistan movements shared much in common, including their timetables, the irreligiosity of their leaders, the novel nature of their nationalist ideas, and the challenge of a minority population gaining political power.
The "love of Zion" goes back to early Judaism but modern political Zionism began with the publication in 1896 of Theodor Herzl's Jewish State; it acquired political reality with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and only at the Biltmore Conference of May 1942 did Jewish nationalists formally declare their intention to establish of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Mr Rehmat Ali Proposed the name of the new country. Pakistan is composed of letters taken from all our homelands- "Indian" and "Asian." That is, Punjab, Afghania (Pakhtunkhwa), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kutch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks -- the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland.
Ironically, the leaders of both these religiously defined national movements were personally irreligious, and some even outspoken atheists. "Even Jews who opposed formal religion saw themselves or at least were seen by others as having a common Jewish culture, with its own literature, language, and modes of social relations." Zionism was not a religious doctrine; pioneers of the Jewish state like David Ben-Gurion were motivated by non-religious socialist ideals, not by messianic dogma. Jewish manual labour, not prayer, was their chosen means. Jinnah was anything but a religious person. Rather, he was known for his aristocratic tastes and lifestyle.
Zionist and Pakistani thinkers both had to cope with the same question: Did their religious community qualify as a nation? How could Jews, dispersed for over two millennia, constitute a single people analogous to the Portuguese or the Chinese? Why should Indians who converted to Islam make up a nation distinct from their non-Muslim neighbours? In short, how could Jews from Berlin and Baghdad or Muslims from Madras and Multan have enough in common to make up a single people?
In reply, Zionists held that history has treated the Jews as a separate and distinct entity and nation. Any realistic solution to the prolonged "Jewish problem" lies not in looking for new rulers but for Jews to become rulers themselves. Similarly, Jinnah held that Muslims are "a nation by any definition."The Muslim League argued that there were historical as well as cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims that neither the passage of time nor interaction could satisfactorily bridge.
Neither was willing to live as a protected or tolerated minority in a post-British dispensation.
Once they came into existence as states, both Pakistan and Israel experienced similar sorts of problems as nations in the making, involving boundaries, migration, language, identity, and the legal order.
Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the happenstance of war and led to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography, for it consisted of west and east wings separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory. Those two halves "were remote from each other in everything from language and high cultural tradition to diet, costume, calendar, standard time and social customs."16 The cession of the east wing in 1971, though very painful, did provide geographic contiguity and national focus to Pakistan.
Between 1948-51, more than 600,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, doubling the Jewish population and drastically altering Israel's cultural map, as most of the new immigrants came from Arab countries. Pakistan's formation was accompanied by the influx of huge numbers of refugees, estimated at fifteen million, the vast majority of whom arrived with little property. Absorbing this refugee population proved a monumental task for both Israel and Pakistan. Besides having to provide for housing, employment, education, and distribution of wealth and opportunities, and having to allow for social and cultural adjustments, each new state had to provide a sense of belonging and national identity. The challenge was heightened in Israel's case by the immigrants' worldwide origins and in Pakistan's by the ethnic diversity of its native population as well as the immigrants from India.
In both countries, few spoke the language that served as official tongue. Hebrew, revived from millennia past as a vernacular, had to be learned by nearly everyone. In many families, parents continued with their diverse mother tongues while Hebrew became the language of the children. Had demographic considerations predominated in Pakistan, Bengali would have been the national language, spoken as it was by more than half of Pakistan's original population. Instead, Urdu -- spoken primarily in the Gangetic belt that lay outside its borders and not the principal language of any province that composed Pakistan -- became the country's official language.
Internal disagreements among both Israelis and Pakistanis are acute. The religious-secular debates are at times extremely intense and eventually could damage the state. Tensions between the Ashkenazi (i.e., Europeans) and the Sephardi (Middle Easterners) has a lesser role but played a crucial role in the defeat of the Labor alignment in 1977. Pakistan was anything but a homogeneous entity at the time of its formation. Establishing a Pakistan identity among a divided population was the primary task of the new state.
Who is a Jew, a Muslim? Who is an Israeli or a Pakistani? What is a Jewish or Islamic state? Both states have struggled to define their core identity. Internal divisions prevent a consensus on the question of who is a Jew or Muslim. As a nation committed to "the ingathering of the exiles," one would expect a general agreement on the Jewish identity. On the contrary, "who is a Jew?" has become among the most controversial and contentious issues in Israel and the passage of time only intensifies the tension. For example, the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union led to major disagreements when, on halachic grounds, the religious establishment questioned the Jewish credentials of many immigrants. Because of their questionable Judaism, those who fought and died in defense of the country have at times been refused burial in Jewish cemeteries. Likewise, conversions to Judaism under Conservative or Reform auspices are not accepted in Israel.
Constitutions. In Israel, domestic differences impeded a written constitution; for the same reason, Pakistan had too many of them. Conflict over the role and position of halacha (religious law) in the Jewish State significantly inhibited Israel from enacting a constitution. What began as a compromise British model of not having a written constitution gradually became a Pandora's box. With the growing influence of religious parties, writing a constitution has become more distant than ever. In its five decades, Pakistan has had seven constitutional arrangements -- those of 1935, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1985.
The parallel religious response to the new states holds particular interest. Supporters of the Zionist and Pakistani enterprises came primarily from the secular middle-class and neither intended to create a theocratic polity. Reflecting on the Declaration of Independence, David Ben-Gurion later remarked that it said something that I know conflicts with the Halacha, universal and equal suffrage without distinctions of sex, religion, race or nationality; and this was adopted even though according to the Halacha women do not have equal rights.... We must undoubtedly respect any Jew who is faithful to the Halacha, but the Halacha does not obligate every Jew.
At a press conference on July 4, 1947, just a month before the independence of Pakistan, Jinnah remarked that it was "absurd" to think that Pakistan would be a religious state. On the eve of partition, he categorically told members of the Constituent Assembly,
“You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims --not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”
According to first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, "Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world." The recognition of the centrality of Islam in the new state was not aimed at making its Sharia the guiding principal. In the words of Paul Brass,
The League leaders were oriented towards achieving secular political power in a modern constitutional-bureaucratic state structure, in which the sharia would be respected but would not prevent legislatures from acting in a sovereign manner and in which secular political leaders would be dominant in a representative regime. In both their goals and their political skills, the Muslim League leaders were more oriented towards and ultimately more successful in the secular political arena in which the political choices had to be made.
In both cases, religious leaders responded negatively to nationalist demands for a religiously-based state. Orthodox Jewry found Zionism unattractive because it contradicted their view that the Jewish state must be formed by the Messiah and not by some non-observant Zionist mortals. Even today, a substantial body of the Orthodox rejects the state, some going so far as to consort with its enemies. This applies even to government functionaries: a former chief rabbi remains seated and studies a religious text while the audience at an official function sings the national anthem; a deputy mayor of Jerusalem dismisses the Israeli flag as a rag.
The idea of a separate Islamic political entity runs counter to the universal brotherhood preached by Islam; if Islam is the authentic nationality of the Muslims everywhere, then political divisions within the Islamic world can only be temporary. If were Pakistan somehow attained, it would confine the sway and glory of Islam to mere corners of the country, Muslims remaining in India would be weakened, and Pakistan would not be a truly Islamic state. Thus, the principal "opposition to the Pakistan demand and to the Muslim League among Muslims came from that segment of the Muslim elite most concerned with the protection of Islam and Muslim culture, from the ulama." In addition, their opposition had much to do with self-interest; the ulema did not see in the Muslim League and in the Pakistan idea an appropriate leadership position for themselves as the true protectors of Islam and Sharia. They also opposed Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan was an unrealistic goal.
Oddly, some of those initially indifferent or even hostile to a state based on religion latterly became among its most fervent advocates and then ambitious to seize control of it. The non-Zionist Orthodox Jews "soon realized that, in a western style democracy, a determined minority has the power to prevent the government from passing laws that ostensibly threaten their sacred principles." Before long, they became key players in the Zionist Knesset and at times indispensable coalition partners. Once Pakistan was created as a "homeland" for the subcontinent's Muslim minorities, religious elements would inevitably try to take control of it. Besides making Pakistan an Islamic Republic the ulema played a crucial role in the legitimization of military rule. An otherwise powerful dictator like Ayub Khan had to make concessions to the ulema and declare Pakistan an Islamic republic. Democracy has been good to the growing ambitions of the religious, with elections enhancing their strength and influence as rival secular parties are compelled to court and solicit the support of the religious leaders and establishment. Religious activists in both countries want such personal and community functions as marriage, divorce, adoption, conversion, burials, and food and travel regulations to come under religious control.
The year 1977 was a major landmark in the approach to religion in both countries, as unprecedented political changes compelled rulers to be more accommodating to the religious conservatives. The ninth Knesset elections of that year abruptly ended the Labour Party's perpetual domination of Israeli politics and when Menachem Begin became prime minister, he was joined, after a gap of over two decades, by the Agudat Israel, a non-Zionist party.Begin conceded various demands made by the religious establishment that previous Israeli governments had hitherto denied. For example, he gave the National Religious Party control of the coveted education ministry, with its ample financial resources and extensive education network.
Pakistan also underwent serious change in 1977 with the imposition of martial law and the overthrow of Zulfiqar Bhutto by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled until 1988. In need of ways to legitimize his rule, Zia ul-Haq looked to Islam. Projecting himself as a pious Muslim seeking to promote the cause of Islam, he introduced a series of legislative acts toward this end.Israelis spend little time publicly discussing Pakistan but are favorably disposed toward the country. The first known Zionist contacts with the Indian sub-continent were with Muslim League rather than Congress leaders: Chaim Weizman met Shaukat Ali in London in January 1931. Israel sees Pakistan as an important Islamic state, a key player in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and a country with nuclear capability. In the public sphere however, relations are not so good.
It is a shame that two countries that were created on the same promise of giving their respective people a homeland where they will be free to practice their religion and create a state where law of their respective religion will reign supreme. They will not be persecuted against by people of Europe in Israel’s case and Hindus of India in Pakistan’s case. In 1947, Pakistan got it’s independence from the British and it’s founding fathers promised to make it an enlightened, modern state where Muslims ( who make up about 98% of the population) will be able to live according to their religious beliefs. Next year, in 1948, a similar promise was made to the people of Israel when it got its own independence from the British. The genesis of both these countries is so similar that you could be forgiven for thinking that these two nations should be the best of friends but that’s where the similarities end. Pakistan has never accepted that the State of Israel exists; on Pakistani passports, all the countries of the worlds are mentioned but for Israel. Israel is Palestine for most of the Pakistanis and must be returned to the Palestinians who are its rightful owners.
But the point I want to make is this: Pakistan must understand that land of Pakistan and Land of Israel have a lot in common than they would like to think,
• people who are in majority in both these countries are the people who believe in the God of Abraham
• who believe in the role of religion in the public life
• who believe in the oneness of God
• who believe in the day of judgement
• who share a reverence for Temple Mount
• who have been persecuted at one time by other ethnicities
• who have been invaded by their larger neighbour immediately after their independence
• who have fought at least three major wars for their survival and to protect their sovereignty and independence
• both are the victim of global media bias
Both countries must acknowledge this common ground especially Pakistan. I must admit that Israel has occupied some areas ( Gaza, West Bank & Golan Heights) which it needs to return but to get to that point , Israel needs help from influential Muslim countries ( Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt) who unlike Iran are not categorically against the existence of Israel.
My particular concern is do with Pakistan, which has no direct dispute with Israel, nor is there a chance for any such eventuality in the near future. There is no reason why Pakistan should not accept Israel and establish a diplomatic presence in Western Jerusalem, the eventual capital of the Israeli state. There is growing body of opinion in Israel, which wants a settlement based on the original borders of the state of Israel and to facilitate that Pakistan can play a role but to do that first we it needs to become a true friend of Israel because at this moment of crisis Pakistan & Israel must stand up and be counted as two responsible states.
I would like to hear your opinions on this issue and start a debate about this issue. What do you think about this issue? Is it a good idea? Is it a bad idea?
Yes, Pakistan and Israel have things like these in common with each other. And about a hundred other countries on the planet.
ReplyDeleteSo - Why should Pakistan recognize the state of Israel?
Hi Ibrahim,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comment. The answer to your question is
simply because this is an issue for Israel's neighbours and if most of them have no problem then why are we as a third party interfering in someone else's issues. Besides, a country can have so many enemies and we should not make enemies without any reason.
To all of my readers and especially Pakistani brothers,
ReplyDeletePlace all comments aside and just think about the national interest of PAKISTAN. Our main concern is the protection and liberty of our HOLY PLACES and granting full religious liberty to all MUSLIMS in CITY OF Jerusalem and this is our main issue and dispute with Israel.Once they accepted our demands then their will be no hurdle in the way to recognized Israel.
Further Recognizing Israel doesn't means that we are going to establish friendly relations with them. When as an extreme enemy we can have diplomatic relations with USA and india then we can have the same with Israel as well.