Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implication For The EU

Zeyno Baran
S. Frederick Starr
Svante E. Cornell


© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program –
A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center
Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Uppsala University, Box 514, 75120 Uppsala, Sweden
www.silkroadstudies.org


Summary and Recommendations
Islamic Radicalism has become a serious problem in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Though these areas are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam
and among the most secularized areas of the Muslim world, radicalism has
made a forceful comeback in the past two decades. Beginning in the late
1980s, alien Islamic proselytizing has gathered speed across the Muslim
regions of the former Soviet Union, and has resulted in the spread of radical
ideologies, militancy, and even terrorism. Worst hit have been the Russian
North Caucasus and some parts of Central Asia, especially the Ferghana
valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Patterns of radicalism differ among the regions. In the North Caucasus, a
Salafi revival in Dagestan coincided with the brutal war in Chechnya, and
contributed to the radicalization of the Chechen resistance and its spread to
adjoining republics. Coupled with backfiring Russian centralization efforts,
the entire North Caucasus is now on the brink of long-term destabilization.
Central Asia, on the other hand, has seen stronger external link, as foreign
radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Qaeda have established a
presence directly, as in the former, or through local allies, as in the latter.
Adding to the problem, these groups in Central Asia have splintered into
smaller entities difficult to identify let alone counteract. In Azerbaijan, long
spared a significant radical presence, an increase in both Shi’a and Salafi
Sunni radicalism can be observed.
The causes of this radicalization are hotly debated. In the west, radicalization
is often blamed on the socio-economic crisis, or political repression
radicalizing oppositional forces. These explanations are only of limited
validity, at best interacting with complex post-Soviet identity crises, personal
vendettas, regional rivalries, relative deprivation, and most importantly
foreign proselytizing, a factor widely underestimated in the West. To this
should be added the criminalization of many of the most notorious militant
8 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, & Svante E. Cornell
armed groups, whose involvement in drug trafficking and other organized
crime has been well-documented.
In the past few years, radical and militant Islamic groups have adapted to the
pressure states and the international community have put on them. In the
North Caucasus, this has led to the conscious decision to spread the
insurgency and activate indigenous sleeper cells across the North Caucasus,
and not only as previously limited to Chechnya. The West, without a
presence in the North Caucasus, has remained a bystander to these events.
The western reaction has been one the one hand understanding for the
challenges faced by the Russian government in the region and support for its
policies; and on the other mild criticism for its counter-productive
centralization policies and repressive rule in the region. Criticism of the
brutal conduct of the war in Chechnya and of the poor management of
Russia’s counter-terrorism efforts that have put hundreds of civilians in
harm’s way has been relatively muted.
In Central Asia, where the West has had a considerable presence, the
reaction has been different. In fact, the West has shown little understanding,
let alone support, for the seriousness of the radical and militant challenge
faced by Central Asian states. Instead, the west has focused on the
governments’ mismanagement of the situation, while refraining from
responding to calls for assistance. This culminated in 2005 following the
insurgency and crackdown in Andijan in Uzbekistan, which left several
hundred people, mainly civilians, dead. The result of the episode and the
mismanagement of the crisis by both the Uzbek and western governments
was the loss of western influence and presence in Uzbekistan. It is apparent
that radical groups now seek to emulate the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia and
Ukraine, aware of the fact that popular rebellion against authoritarian
governments attracts support and not condemnation from the West. Hence,
several groups appear to have adapted to this environment and benefited
from the breakdown in Uzbekistan’s relations with the West.
In this environment, there are several important implications for the West
and the European Union in particular, explored in further detail in this paper:
1. Develop skills, especially in the intelligence community, in
understanding the ideological framework of the radical and terrorist
groups.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
2. The radical and externally sponsored Islamic movements and
organizations existing in the region offer little hope for a meaningful
dialogue. Instead, it is the moderate majority and the secular parts of
the population, that should be engaged in dialogue.
3. The West needs to support reform-minded officials within
governments, not just anti-government forces. The West needs to find
points for collaboration within the governments, to support
progressive groups and work toward evolutionary change.
4. The link between drug trafficking and religious extremism is proven
beyond doubt, and the majority of demand for drugs arises from EU
countries. Lending major financial support to counter-narcotics would
hence be a major effort in fighting militancy and terrorism.
5. The EU should promote continental trade across Central Asia and the
Caucasus, which would bring new economic opportunities to these
populations and reduce the appeal of radicalism.
6. EU educational exchanges should increase, and extended to the
provinces, including those experiencing Islamic radical movements.
7. The EU should focus assistance on the delivery of governmental
services to deprived areas, and in general, on greater degrees of
decentralization and self-government.
8. Further, the EU should treat the issue of support for extremism in
Central Asia, including Afghanistan, and the Caucasus as a subject for
bilateral discussion with relevant Arab states and Iran.
9. The EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is
relevant to understanding the tension between trying to create a
modern and open democratic system and dealing with the threat of
fundamentalist and militant Islamic political ideology. To this end, the
EU should engage Turkey as it addresses issues of Islamic radicalism
in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
10
The Muslim Mainstream and Secularism
Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus cannot be divorced from
the region’s larger religious context or its overall cultural environment. Thus,
any measures to combat or limit Islamic radicalism must be evaluated not
only in terms of their impact on the Islamists themselves but also on the
larger society in which the extremists are a small minority. That larger
society is dominated by two currents that would appear to be poles apart: a
large Muslim mainstream and a smaller but equally important secular realm.
On closer inspection, these two components of the region’s culture today
turn out to be deeply, even inextricably, intertwined with one another.
Indeed, both parties to this interrelationship see their links with the other as
a source of strength, not of weakness. Any sound western measures against
Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus must be calculated to
strengthen these two elements of the social mainstream and to preserve a
harmonious relationship between them, and not alienate them.
The Muslim Mainstream
Islam is by no means the only religion to have flourished in Central Asia and
the Caucasus. Prior to the Arab invasions of the seventh century, this region
was the main locus of Zoroastrianism. This fundamental religion of both
East and West gave the world the concepts of both Heaven (paradise) and
Hell, and also of saints, and thus directly inspired Judaism, Christianity and
Islam itself. Central Asia was also a great center of Buddhism, the region
where that faith was consolidated and codified in a way that enabled it to be
transmitted to China, Korea, and Japan.
Absorbed into this world, Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus took on
several distinctive features that long distinguished it from its Arab variant.
First, it had a strong and consistent practical streak. The traders who
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
11
adopted Islam naturally favored the Hanafi school of law, Islam’s most
pragmatic and worldly system of regulating conduct. Second, it possessed a
strong analytical streak that interacted easily with classical and secular
learning. Thanks to this, Central Asians played an exceptionally powerful
role in codifying Islam, with al Bukhari’s compendium of the sayings of
Mohammed remaining the standard text. Third, it was indifferent and even
hostile to formalism. When by the eleventh century Arab Islam had gelled
into a stultifying array of external rituals, Central Asian Islam reacted by
developing the Sufi movements, which rapidly took root also in the
Caucasus.
Directly influenced by Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity, Sufism stressed
inner spirituality, mysticism, and the cult of saints. The latter led to an
intensive localization of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with shrines
to local saints dotting the landscape in a way that aside from South Asia has
its closest parallel not in the Muslim world but in Mediterranean
Catholicism. Tradition asserts that the relics of Old Testament patriarchs
like Solomon and Daniel, the Christian apostle St. Matthew, and many of
the founders of Islam itself are all to be found in the region. Whether or not
this is true, it has left Muslims there convinced that their region is the
heartland of the faith, not a provincial outpost.
The one point on which Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus followed the
Arabs was its close links to political power. St. Paul’s dictum to “Render unto
Caesar…” has no meaning for either Arab or Central Asian Islam, which
assume instead that the secular power’s first responsibility is always to
protect the faith.
The Secular Strain
The rich preexistent culture of Central Asia and the Caucasus adapted Islam
as much as it adopted it. In no area was this more evident than in secular
learning. Ibn Sina (known to Europe as Avicenna, the founder of modern
medicine), al Khorezmi (inventor of algorithms), and many other scientists
advanced secular learning, even as they affirmed Islam. This strain died out
even before the Mongol conquest but remains a cultural factor to this day, its
memory having been reclaimed in Soviet times.
12 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
Soviet rule in Central Asia and the Caucasus found an Islam that was
stagnant, dogmatic, and illiterate, and which had lost contact with its greatest
days. The Soviets repressed most Muslim institutions and reduced them to
the conduct of life-cycle rituals. Mass Soviet education successfully imposed
both literacy and secular western learning on the entire population. By the
1960s one could be “Muslim” in the sense of practicing birth, marriage, and
death rituals, but meanwhile participate fully in the secular world. This was
the easier since many of the great thinkers Central Asia gave to the world
had practiced the same dualism centuries earlier. It is fair to say that nearly
the entire intelligentsia of Central Asia and the Caucasus came to fit this
pattern, while the rest of the population absorbed large doses of Soviet
popular culture at the expense of a fading knowledge of Islam.
Secularism was, and remains, equated with social mobility and modernity. It
is also intertwined with western links and orientations, whether via Russia
during Soviet times or directly today. At the same time, it was organized
around the secular religion of Communism, which was particularly
important among the less educated. The erosion of faith in salvation through
Marxism-Leninism opened a cultural and psychological gap. Secular parts of
the population filled it by looking directly to the West for the first time. The
rest of the population tried to follow suit, but at the same time began groping
into the region’s Muslim heritage for a new base of identity.
The states supported both developments simultaneously, seeing them as
complementary. Mainstream traditional Muslim practice revived to some
extent. As this happened, positive links between Islam and the states were
forged anew, using old patterns. Meanwhile, new channels into the broader
secular world opened with the help of state support in the form of
international scholarships, etc.
For a small number of both secular and traditional inhabitants of the region,
this new arrangement proved inadequate. Both the modern secular world and
the world of traditional Central Asian Islam remained for them remote and
inaccessible. For such people, the present became a very uncomfortable place,
for they found themselves unable to move either forward or back. This is the
dilemma into which Islamic radicalism imposed itself. Islamic radicalism
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
13
emerged as a means of filling the psychological gap left by both traditional
Islam and secular modernism.
Some western analysts and NGOs claim that this gap exists because the
governments, especially in Central Asia, are hostile to Islam and because
they pursue repressive policies towards the “especially pious.” Alternatively,
they claim that “official” Islam has sold out to the state and no longer has at
heart the interests of “true believers.” Neither claim is on the mark. Without
exception, Central Asian governments support the practice of Islam among
their people as it has evolved over the centuries. Their methods vary, and,
especially in Turkmenistan, are mixed inextricably with the interests of the
state. Yet in their strong opposition to forms of Islam that are deemed
irregular, let alone “foreign,” the secular and religious leaders are at one.
Pluralism among religions may be practiced in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent also in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (but
definitely not in Turkmenistan), but pluralism within Islam is all but
nonexistent, with the partial exceptions of Azerbaijan, with its coexistence of
Shi’a and Sunni currents, and Tajikistan, where Sunni and Ismailis coexist.
The greatest danger to the faith is from being smothered by the state’s
embrace rather than being ignored by civil authorities. And the subservient
relation between the local religious elites (Muftis, etc.) and governments
differs little from what existed prior to Russian colonization. Indeed, the
shared hostility of religious and secular leaders to all non-traditional forms of
Islam is virtually identical to the hostility that the region’s emirs and muftis
showed to religious deviants over the past five centuries.
Significantly, this stance today enjoys the strong support of the vast majority
of the region’s population, just as it did in 1800, or 1500. Islamic radicalism, in
short, presents genuine and serious dangers to the societies of Central Asia
and the Caucasus but nowhere is it likely to become a mass movement. It is
significant that no election or authoritative opinion poll in the region has
found more than 5 percent support for radical Islamists of any stripe.
14
Currents of Islamic Radicalism in the Region
Islamists have long been interested in Central Asia, a historic center of
classical Islam located in a region of strategic importance. Yet, they entered
the region in significant ways only since the late 1980s, as it had been closed
off to the rest of the Islamic world by decades of harsh Soviet rule. As for
the Caucasus, the South Caucasus is the only major Shi’a center in the
former Soviet Union, while the Northeastern Caucasus – mainly Dagestan –
has been a center of Sunni activism. Islamic currents in Central Asia and the
Caucasus display significant similarities but also important differences. The
North Caucasus is a particular case, where the war in Chechnya has been a
major incubator of extremism, bringing foreign Islamic volunteers and
groups to the region, which pushed parts of the Chechen resistance toward
Islamic militancy and terrorism.
Geographic Focal Points
An Islamic revival has taken place across Central Asia and the Caucasus.
This revival represents a natural return to spiritual values following decades
of Communist atheism. In turn, the Soviet heritage has survived in the sense
of a level of acceptance of secularism that is substantially higher than in most
other parts of the Muslim world. Yet the strength of this revival, and in
particular signs of Islamic radicalization, have been largely confined to
specific localities within this larger region. This has been partly related to
differing strength of Islamic tradition, but also to external factors such as
foreign proselytizing, and to domestic political and social developments, such
as armed conflict and political systems.
In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of radical groups has been
the Ferghana valley, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek
territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The valley has traditionally been a center of Islamic fervor, and was the area
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
15
where foreign radicals first established a presence. As we will see, though,
there are other factors besides tradition at work here.
Aside from the Ferghana valley, the main other localities of radicalism have
been Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. The spread of radical Islamic
political movement in Tajikistan in the 1980s was very much a result of the
growing interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan during the Soviet
occupation there. Islamic radicalism was the key force behind the resistance
to the Soviet occupation, and spread to Tajikistan where important political
movements on an Islamic basis emerged. South Kyrgyzstan is exposed to
most of the same currents that prevail in neighboring Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. By contrast, northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
have seen considerably lower levels of Islamic activity.
Dagestan is probably the most traditionally Islamic area in the Caucasus.
This was true in Soviet times and remains the case at present. Indeed,
Dagestan was one of the earliest areas to convert to Islam, and Derbent was a
major outpost of the early Islamic armies in their struggle with the Khazar
state in the North Caspian. Whereas Azerbaijan later came under the
Map of the Ferghana Valley
16 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
influence of Shi’a Islam, Dagestan stayed strongly Sunni. By contrast,
Chechnya and Ingushetia were not converted to Islam until the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, roughly the time of the conversion to Islam of the
northwestern Caucasus. Hence pre-Islamic traditions and pagan beliefs
remain stronger in all of these republics than in Dagestan, where Islam took
an early hold on society. This has also made Dagestan the most promising
area for Islamic proselytism. Salafi movements first came to Dagestan in the
late 1980s, and Dagestan in the 1990s gradually became a base for Salafi
movements. Following the Russian defeat in Chechnya in 1996, radical
Islamic groups acquired an ever stronger foothold there as well, greatly
influencing Chechnya’s political development. Only since the onset of
second Chechen war did radicalism further spread in a significant manner to
the remaining republics of the North Caucasus, taking advantage of the grave
socio-economic problems there and the Russian government’s failure to
address these problems, enabling these groups to recruit among the
disenfranchised youth of the region.1
As for the South Caucasus, three areas of Azerbaijan and one in Georgia
have been particularly affected by radicalism. Azerbaijan’s southern areas
around Lenkoran are historically the most fervently Shi’a regions of the
country, and are also the areas where Iranian state-sponsored proselytism has
been most active. A resurgence of Shi’a movements has been observed here,
though the radical elements remain relatively weak. In the predominantly
Sunni North of Azerbaijan, bordering Dagestan, a parallel growth of Islamic
fervor has been observed, influenced strongly by Dagestan but also to some
extent by Turkish Islamic groups. Finally, in the capital Baku and its
surroundings, both Shi’a and Sunni Islamic activity has grown. As for
Georgia, the Pankisi gorge bordering Chechnya was a center of Islamic
activity following the renewed Chechen war in 1999, where foreign Chechen
as well as Arab movements briefly prospered. It is notable that radicalism in
the South Caucasus has a strong element of contagion from bordering
regions.
1 For further detail, see the report released in parallel with this paper, Svante E. Cornell
and S. Frederick Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Washington & Uppsala:
Silk Road Paper, CACI & SRSP Joint Center, 2006. (www.silkroadstudies.org)
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
17
The Origin of Radical Groups
The first recent Islamists came to Central Asia in the 1970s. By this time,
many of the repressed clergy members had begun to lose contact with the
traditional Hanafi school of Islam and began to be influenced by Salafi-
Wahhabi thought – thanks to the initial work of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the
Muslim Brotherhood. The first Ikhwan group to arrive in Central Asia
consisted of an ethnically diverse collection of Muslim students from
countries such as Jordan, Iraq and Afghanistan. These students created the
“Tashkent Group,” which sought to establish clandestine cells in Central
Asian universities with the goal of recruiting local students into their
movement and ultimately establishing an Islamic state. While at first they
operated secretly, the Ikhwan and other Islamists began to act more openly
as the reforms of perestroika were implemented. They were further
emboldened in their openness by the Taliban takeover of neighboring
Afghanistan in the 1990s.
For most radical Islamists, the main point of entry to the region was the
Ferghana Valley, a densely populated area with a traditionally deeply
religious population. The valley is shared among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. At first, four radical Islamist groups were active there: Adolat
(Justice), Baraka (Blessings), Tauba (Repentance), and Islam Lashkarlari
(Warriors of Islam). These groups existed underground during the Soviet
period, but emerged in the era of Gorbachev’s reforms. Over time, other
groups also became active in the region, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and its
splinter groups Akramiya and Hizb un-Nusrat, as well as Uzun Soqol (Long
Beards), Tabligh Jamaat, Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hizballah, and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Since the operation in Afghanistan
following 9/11, the IMU has apparently splintered into additional groups,
such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic
Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG). The
Turkish Nurcular (followers of light), a less radical group working openly,
has also established a presence.
In Azerbaijan, radical movements sponsored by Iran and organizations in the
Persian Gulf region have led to the growth of Salafi and radical Shi’a
thought, but the growth of clandestine organizations has been controllable. In
18 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
the North Caucasus, the Islamic groups are less clearly structured in
identifiable groups, given their merger with Chechen guerrilla formations.
Indeed, the militant element in the Chechen war was grafted upon it by Arab
volunteers, most prominently the late Emir Al-Khattab (Samer bin Saleh bin
Abdallah al-Sweleim), a Saudi veteran of the wars in Afghanistan, Tajikistan
and Bosnia who made the Chechen cause his own, while contributing greatly
to changing the course of the war from a nationalist to a religious conflict –
similarly to what like-minded groups had tried to do in Kosovo in 1998-99.
Kosovo, as Chechnya, was predominantly Sufi in tradition, implying a
moderate, introspective and tolerant form of Islam that radicals despise. The
grafting of the Jihadi element succeeded in the Chechen war but failed in
Kosovo due to the ‘glaring contrast’ in international reaction.2 NATO
supported the Kosovo Liberation Army’s fight against Serbian oppression,
contributing to the movement’s choice to mainly remain aloof of Islamic
radicals courting them. On the other hand, the Chechens were isolated with
no external support, leading several important field commanders to gradually
embrace the foreign jihadis, in the process marginalizing the moderate,
secular-minded Chechen political leadership. In the North Caucasus more
generally, the Islamic radicals are organized in the form of small Jamaats or
societies, which operate politically and militarily in an undercover fashion.
While their methods and strategies may differ, almost all of the groups listed
above have as a shared goal the overthrow of the secular government and
society and the establishment of an Islamic state, typically a Caliphate. Hizb
ut-Tahrir, however, is the only group with a coherent ideology. Neither
Osama bin Laden, nor former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, nor IMU leader
Tahir Yuldashev has come up with an ideological and theological framework
that justifies their actions. Instead, these and other leaders have relied on the
comprehensive teachings of Hizb ut-Tahrir – which is currently the most
popular radical movement in Central Asia.
2 See Brian Glyn Williams, “Jihad and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Eurasia. On the
Trail of Trans-National Islamic Holy Warriors in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central
Asia, Chechnya, and Kosovo”, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 2 no. 3-4, March
2003. (www.ethnopolitics.org)
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
19
Radical Groups: A Survey
The following pages provide a short survey of the radical Islamic groups
active in the region. This will include groups across a political spectrum
ranging from self-proclaimed peaceful groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and
Tabligh Jemaat, to militant and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan and the North Caucasian groups tied to Chechen warlord
Shamil Basayev.
Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya (The Islamic Party of Liberation)3
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded in 1952-1953 by Shaykh Taqiuddin al-
Nabhani in Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem. Its main goal is to recreate the
Caliphate, the Islamic state formally brought to an end in 1924 following the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Al-Nabhani died in 1977 and was succeeded
by Abu Yusuf Abdul Qadim Zallum, another Palestinian cleric who led the
movement until his illness and death in 2003. He was succeeded by Ata Ibnu
Khaleel Abu Rashta, who previously served as the party’s official spokesman
in Jordan. Abu Rashta, alias Abu Yasin, is a Palestinian who is believed to
have lived most recently in the West Bank. Under his leadership, HT
activities have become more aggressive. During fall 2003, the governing body
(kiedat) is believed to have instructed members to engage in acts of
aggression towards the diplomatic representations of countries that supported
the Iraq War. At the same time, members are urged to reach out to the liberal
politicians and media, as well as pro-democracy and human rights NGOs to
obtain their support in their own “freedom” agenda. Today HT is active in
over 40 countries, with its ideological “nerve center” in London, and official
headquarters in Jordan.
Whereas the West has seemingly forgotten the ideological dimension of the
war on terror – the “war of ideas” – HT is openly discussing how it is
engaged in such a war, which is aimed at undermining the legitimacy of both
liberal democracy and market economy. Indeed, over the last several years,
HT’s long-standing vision of creating a global Caliphate has become a
3 For a detailed analysis of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, see Zeyno Baran, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Islam’s
Political Insurgency, Washington DC: The Nixon Center, 2004.
(http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf).
20 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
mainstream terrorist goal. Although HT’s immediate aim is to create a
Caliphate somewhere in the Muslim world, ultimately it seeks a global reach.
This is evidenced in a 1999 leaflet, which states: “In the forthcoming days the
Muslims will conquer Rome and the dominion of the [nation] of
Muhammad will reach the whole world and the rule of the Muslims will
reach as far as the day and night.” (‘Rome’ is characteristically used to refer
to the U.S. in Islamist writings.)
HT claims to be non-violent, and this is the basis for its successful aspiration
to function legally in western Europe, where only Germany has banned the
movement. Yet HT openly acknowledges that violence may eventually be
necessary in order to overthrow the regimes standing in the way of the
Caliphate. Thus HT cannot be called “non-violent”; rather, its ideology
suggests that it is not using violence yet but will do so when the time is right.
HT’s decision not to use violence stems from a pragmatic policy, having
learned from the experience of other Islamist groups (and most recently from
the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions) that the “peaceful” overthrow of
authoritarian or corrupt governments receives international commendation,
whereas violence and coup attempts lead to imprisonment or worse.
The ideology that forms the basis of HT’s work is by no means ‘non-violent’.
It is viciously anti-Semitic and anti-Western, and disseminates a radical
Islamist ideology fundamentally opposed to liberal democracy, the free
market, and to Western concepts of freedom more broadly. While HT as an
organization does not engage in terrorist activities, it operates as an
ideological vanguard that supports and encourages terrorist acts.
Furthermore, its members appear to be recruits of movements that do involve
in violence.
HT calls for the unity of the umma – a unity which it seeks to bring about by
emulating the steps that the Prophet Muhammad took to establish the
original Caliphate. According to al-Nabhani, the Prophet’s work was
performed in “clearly defined stages, each of which he used to perform
specific clear actions” that led, in the end, to the creation of a Sharia-based
Islamic government. HT effectively combines Marxist-Leninist
methodology and Western-style slogans with reactionary Islamist ideology
to shape the internal debate within Islam. As an organization, HT also bears
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
21
striking similarities to the early Bolshevik movement. Both have an
ultimate, utopian political goal (whether “true communism” or the
Caliphate), and both show an intense dislike for liberal democracy, while
seeking to establish a mythical “just society.” Both also function with a
secretive cell system. And while it insists on non-violence until the final
stage, HT does justify the use of force, just as Lenin and the Bolsheviks did
in 1917.
In a recent interview, an HT member put the organization’s vision
succinctly: “Islam obliges Muslims to possess power so that they can
intimidate – I would not say terrorize – the enemies of Islam … In the
beginning the Caliphate would strengthen itself internally and it would not
initiate jihad … But after that, we would carry Islam as an intellectual call to
all the world … And we will make people bordering the Caliphate believe in
Islam. Only if they refuse, then we’ll ask them to be ruled by Islam … And
after all discussions and negotiations they still refuse, then the last resort will
be a jihad to spread the spirit of Islam and the rule of Islam. This is done in
the interests of all people to get them out of darkness and into light.”4 Its
partly leaflets, accessible over the Internet in various languages, provide the
umma with timely and coherent explanations of current events that fit HT’s
ideological framework. The language of these leaflets is simple and direct; for
instance, many repeat the call to Muslims to “kill Jews wherever you find
them.”
The tight compartmentalization of HT ensures that little information is
known about its financial structure. The movement’s cell structure ensures
that data obtained from all but the most senior members is of little
importance. Hence Central Asian and Western authorities have been unable
to deny the group access to its funding sources. Moreover, HT does not
require a great deal of money to sustain its activities. Its ability to create a
virtual Islamic community on the Internet has allowed the movement to
reach the hearts and minds of many without investing in an elaborate
communications network or in party offices. Interviews with arrested HT
members indicate that local entrepreneurs, party members and other
4 James Brandon, “The Caliphate: One nation, under Allah, with 1.5 billion Muslims,”
Christian Science Monitor, (10 May 2006)
22 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
sympathizers tend to make individual donations to HT’s local organs.
Meanwhile, more detached businessmen and Islamic charities are most likely
to direct their money to HT’s leadership committee, which in turn sends
money to the movement’s various regional branches. Funding is essentially
drawn from a combination of private donations and the dues of party
members. The latter is particularly significant, since in Central Asia each
member is obliged to donate between 5 percent and 20 percent of their
monthly income to the party.
Since 2001, there has been a clear and consistent trend towards the
radicalization of HT. In June 2001, the HT publication Al-Waie
(Consciousness) stated unequivocally that it is acceptable to carry out suicide
attacks with explosive belts. In March 2002, HT argued that suicide bombs in
Israel are a legitimate tactic of war. Over the next two years, HT leaflets and
writings continuously emphasized that in the context of a clash of
civilizations, offensive jihad against the Americans and the Jewish people is
acceptable. It went as far as declaring, in a May 2003 leaflet, that jihad against
unbelievers is the only type of jihad. At the time, an HT website displayed
an image of American soldiers superimposed over the burning of the twin
towers, carrying the legend “U.S. Troops: Die Hard.” It is yet to be
established whether HT has already formed a militant wing or whether it is
simply “inspiring” members independently to join terrorist groups or engage
in terrorist acts.
HT has made Central Asia its main battleground. The post-Communist
identity crisis there implies a limited popular knowledge of the tenets of
traditional Islam, which benefits a radical, unorthodox movement such as
HT. Furthermore, poor economic performance by some Central Asian
governments has denied them a high level of popular support among people
who feel they lack opportunities for socio-economic improvement. HT’s
public relations campaign has already succeeded in diverting the world
community’s attention away from its activities in Uzbekistan. As a result of
this propaganda effort, western observers are concerned more with the prison
conditions of HT supporters than the possibility of a successful HT coup
d’état. Also assisting HT’s campaign in Central Asia is the proximity of
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
23
Afghanistan and Pakistan, two primary bases for terrorists and radical
sympathizers.
While in principle a centralized movement, HT is known to have splintered,
including into specific Central Asian splinter groups. To date, known HT
splinter groups include:
o Palestinian Islamic Jihad ( founded in 1958)—Shaykh Assad Bayyoud
Tamimi, a former HT member, founded both PIJ and a second splinter
group, the Islamic Jihad Organization (also known as the al-Aqsa
Battalions), which was created in 1982. PIJ has no known presence in
Central Asia or the Caucasus.
o Al-Muhajiroun (1996)—Omar Bakri Muhammad, a former HT
member, founded this extremely radical organization. Bakri has
claimed to be “the eyes of Osama bin Laden” and reports indicate that
communication between the two men dates back at least as far as 1998.
Bakri fled London after the July 2005 bombings there. Al-Muhajiroun
has no known presence in Central Asia or the Caucasus.
o Akramiya (1995)—Formed in the Uzbekistani section of the Ferghana
Valley, it is a group with a primarily local focus (mentioned below).
o Hizb un-Nusrat (1999)—The Party of Assistance (mentioned below).
HT material was first brought to Uzbekistan in the late 1970s, but its
activities there took shape in earnest only during 1992-1995, in the Ferghana
Valley. HT is still most active in the Ferghana Valley, but has successfully
spread to the rest of Uzbekistan and to all other Central Asian countries, as
well as Azerbaijan. The February 1999 bombings in Tashkent were wrongly
attributed to HT, though the charge was later retracted. Yet this sparked the
activation of the movement in the region.
As a result of the repressive methods used by the authorities in the
subsequent crackdown, many HT members left Uzbekistan and moved to
more open Central Asian states, thus becoming excellent missionaries for the
movement. At first, many settled in the ethnic Uzbek regions of Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan, but the group’s activities have since expanded. Within the
last year, Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been arrested in northern Kazakhstan,
the Bishkek area of Kyrgyzstan, and in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe—
24 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
areas that are neither near the border with Uzbekistan nor known for
significant Uzbek minority populations.
The precise number of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Central Asia today is
difficult to estimate. HT is numerically strongest in Uzbekistan, with
estimates there ranging from 7,000 up to 60,000 members. There are 3,000–
5,000 members in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The number in
Kazakhstan is no more than a few hundred. But numbers are not central to
HT’s strategy which is based on penetrating political power centers as a
method of obtaining power. Recent arrests indicate that support for HT is
growing throughout the region, including among teachers, military officers,
politicians (especially those whose relatives have been arrested), and other
members of the elite.
Akramiya
Akramiya is named after its leader Akram Yuldashev, born in 1963 in
Andijan. Yuldashev is believed to have been a member of HT for one year
before founding a splinter group in 1992. He is believed to be profoundly
influenced by al-Nabhani, and founded Akramiya in his native Andijan
region, preaching widely among the youth of the area. He was first arrested
in 1993 and later that year received amnesty and was released. Following the
bomb attacks in February 1999, he was re-arrested and sentenced to over ten
years in prison.
In 1992, Yuldashev wrote a theological pamphlet in Uzbek titled “Yimonga
Yul” (The Path to Faith), which aims to call people to Islam. According to
Uzbek scholar Bakhtior Babajanov, Yuldashev wrote a supplement (in
March 2005) to this more philosophical piece, in which he outlined a fivestage
process to establish an Islamic leadership. Those few analysts who have
read the supplement believe that Akramiya shares HT’s conspiratorial
methodology and its multistage process for achieving the ultimate objective
of the Caliphate. The aim of Akramiya is to gather enough strength to exert
influence on regional authorities, if not to control them directly. With this
aim in mind, Akramiya promotes a simplified version of Islam, in order to
maximize its potential support base. Its structure is communal and cult-like,
and members have limited exposure to outsiders.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
25
Akramiya seems to have been rather successful in developing a following by
delivering on socio-economic promises that the Uzbek government has been
unable to fulfill: jobs and money. Wealthier followers set up small businesses
such as bakeries, cafeterias, or shoe factories, in which they employ young
males who are then required to attend study groups after work – a practice
also known from other Islamic movements across the world to recruit
followers. The owners of these businesses contribute about a fifth of their
profits to a fund, which then assists poorer members of the group. This is one
of the most successful examples of the bottom-up approach of pro-Islamic
social engineering.
Hizb un-Nusrat
Hizb un-Nusrat (the Party of Assistance) was founded by a group of HT
members in Tashkent in 1999. Its current leader and founder is believed to be
Sharipzhon Mirzazhanov. Like HT, this group is fundamentally clandestine
in nature, and prospective members must undergo six months of training in
The System of Islam, HT’s guidebook. Members are also required to donate
money to the party’s communal fund. Unlike HT, however, this group does
not spread propaganda among the general public. Instead, it only recruits
those whose backgrounds are first investigated. The group is thus mainly
comprised of former members of other Islamic fringe groups, and those
accused by Uzbekistan’s government of engagement in Islamic radical
activities. Its supporters also include HT sympathizers who fear public
exposure.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
The IMU was formed in 1992 by Tahir Yuldashev, an underground Islamic
cleric who operated out of the Otavalihon mosque, in the Namangan region
of Uzbekistan. Yuldashev’s views were shaped by extensive travel to Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where he was influenced by Wahhabism
and Deobandism.5 His radical message spread throughout the network of
5 Established in India in the 1860s, the Deobandi school was a purist form of reform
within Islam, nominally within the majority and normally tolerant Hanafi school of
thought, but with much influence from the rising orthodoxy of Wahhabism in Saudi
26 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
mosques and madrassas in the Ferghana Valley. With the help of al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, Harakat-ul-Ansar and al-Jihad, Yuldashev unified the four radical
Islamist groups mentioned above (Adolat and Islam Laskarlari, both of which
he led, as well as Barak and Tauba), under the framework of the IMU. At
first, all four groups consisted of only a few hundred members, but in the
absence of decisive action by the Uzbekistani government, they were able to
disseminate their propaganda in the Ferghana Valley and recruit many more
followers.6
Yuldashev’s ally, Juma Khodjiev Namangani, became the military
commander of the IMU. Along with a Saudi-trained militant, Abdul Ahad,
Namangani was Yuldashev’s main supporter. By 1998, there were reports of
hundreds of Uzbek mujahidin training in and operating between Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, taking advantage of Tajikistan’s civil war.
The first instance of IMU violence occurred in August 1999, when
Namangani and his associates abducted Japanese geologists, along with
Kyrgyzstani government officials and military personnel in southern
Kyrgyzstan, thus expanding its activity to a third country. The IMU was
also believed to be launching carefully orchestrated attacks against
Uzbekistan from neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including the 1999
Tashkent bombings. Soon thereafter, when Namangani declared his aim to
seize the region by force, thousands of refugees fled the Ferghana Valley.
Namangani then headed for Afghanistan where, with the permission of the
Arabia. Like Wahhabism, Deobandi Islam rejects the concept of Ijtehad or
interpretation of religious tenets according to context and circumstance.
6 For further detail on the IMU, see Vitaly Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The
Case of The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet
Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2003; Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan and the Threat from
Islamic Extremism, Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies
Research Centre, Report no. K39, March 2003; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad:The Rise of Militant Islam in
Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.; Ahmed Rashid, “They’re Only
Sleeping – Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Aren’t Going to Go Away”, The New
Yorker, 14 January 2002; Bakhrom Tursunova and Marina Pikulina, Severe Lessons of Batken,
Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Report no. K28, November 1999; Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, “The Development of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Turkestan)”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns
Hopkins University, 2003; Richard Weitz, “Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27 no. 6, 2004,
p. 505-530; Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism and Armed Conflict: The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan”, Terrorism and Political Violence , vol. 17 no. 3, 2005, 577-597.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
27
Taliban, he established an IMU training camp. Militants from all over the
Ferghana Valley began to flock to the camp to receive instruction in terrorist
tactics, under the guidance of the Taliban. In the only interview he has ever
given, Yuldashev declared, “The goal of IMU activities is the creation of an
Islamic State. We declared a jihad in order to create a religious system and
government. We want the model of Islam which is nothing like in
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.”
In late 2001, the IMU joined forces with the Taliban and al-Qaeda against
U.S.-led forces during the Afghanistan campaign. After suffering grave
losses (including the death of Namangani in Afghanistan), some IMU
fighters fled to South Waziristan (a Federally Administered Tribal Area in
Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province along the border with Afghanistan),
along with other jihadists who also escaped U.S. entrapment at Tora Bora.
On orders from Bin Laden, IMU militants have taken a leading role in South
Waziristan, with Yuldashev in command of military activities. Since the
conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU’s infrastructure and
manpower has been significantly weakened, but today there are at least 150
IMU militants who still have the capacity to fight.
HT and the IMU do not have a formal alliance, as it runs contrary to HT’s
interests to be directly associated with a terrorist group. The main difference
between the two groups is one of focus: The IMU openly advocates and
carries out militant operations, while HT concentrates on the ideological
battle. The two nonetheless admit to the closeness of their goals, and both are
propelled closer to the achievement of their ends by the weakness of Central
Asian states.
The Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA)
Central Asian governments believe that in 2002 the region’s Islamic radicals
united in a framework of a new underground organization called the Islamic
Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), which would bring together the IMU,
Kyrgyz and Tajik radicals, and Uighur separatists from China, whose East
Turkestan Islamic Movement had recently broadened to include Afghans,
Chechens, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Kazakhs who share its new goal of forming
an Islamic state in Central Asia.
28 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
Kyrgyz authorities believe that the IMCA was indeed formed in 2003, with
the immediate goal of creating a Caliphate in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the
Kyrgyz Republic, while reserving expansion to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and northwest China for a second stage. The headquarters of IMCA, which
is led by Yuldashev, are believed to be located in Afghanistan’s northeastern
Badakhshan province. This unified, militant Islamic force seeks to
destabilize Central Asian governments by attacking American and Israeli
targets. The main insurgent targets are the American bases in Uzbekistan
(now closed) and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the embassies in Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan.
While many other radical Islamist organizations have mushroomed in the
region over the last two years, they can all be considered, in one way or
another, to be under the IMCA umbrella.
Tabligh Jamaat (TJ)
TJ was established in India in the 1920s by Maulana Mohammad Ilyas as a
direct response to Hindu proselytizing. The group claims to follow the
Prophet’s sunnah (way of life), which to Tabligh members means wearing
long beards, robes, and leather shoes to replicate the Prophet’s dress; the
group firmly believes in outwardly showing that one is Muslim. Members
are also required to conduct “Tabligh,” that is, to try and convert others to
Islam, on a regular basis. Members can spend this time camping in small
groups in order to preach “the Prophet’s way” in mosques. In Central Asia,
they also preach in bazaars. Today, Tabligh has offices and schools in
Canada and the UK, though its main centers are on the Indian subcontinent.
Its annual gatherings in India and Pakistan attract hundreds of thousands.
Tabligh’s annual summit in Raiwind is the largest Muslim gathering in the
world following the hajj.
The group does not involve itself in politics (and has been criticized by
radical Islamists for being apolitical), but over time Tabligh has become an
international movement, active mostly in South and Central Asia. Tabligh
has succeeded in introducing Islamic networks to Europe and the U.S., and
often functions in parallel to the Wahhabi Muslim World League. In recent
years, like many other Islamic movements, Tabligh has also become
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
29
radicalized. Consequently, those who learn about Islam via the Tabligh are
today at risk of supporting or joining terrorist groups. The group has been
accused of having indoctrinated its followers to fight for the Taliban and al-
Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups are believed to have used Tabligh as their
cover to travel and smuggle operatives across borders; because the group is
apolitical, Tabligh’s members can fairly easily travel between countries.
Other terrorist groups may have used the movement as a recruitment pool;
its failure to discuss politics leaves room for others to provide a political
message. In Central Asia, Tabligh is currently most active in the Ferghana
Valley, especially in Andjian. Following their arrest in the summer of 2004,
14 members of Tabligh were sent to prison.
Jeyshullah
The Jeyshullah group is a terrorist Salafi group in Azerbaijan. It was mainly
active in the late 1990s, reportedly responsible for several murders and an
attack against the Hare Krishna society’s Baku headquarters. In spite of being
Salafi in orientation, the group according to Azerbaijani authorities had clear
contacts with Iran, and potentially is related to a group with the same name
that was briefly active in Turkey in the mid-1990s. Jeyshullah is thought to
have planned to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Baku. The groups leaders were
apprehended and sentenced in 2000.7 Little more is known about the group’s
origins and finances.
The North Caucasus Militant Network
Islamic radical groups in the North Caucasus are somewhat different from
those in Central Asia, given the very specific conditions of the region – being
a part of Russia and a zone of war. The radicalization of parts of the Chechen
resistance took place mainly after the first war in Chechnya. The first war
had been mainly a nationalist affair, though isolated mujahids made their
way there. The first presence of Gulf organizations reportedly took place in
1995, when the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation is
7 “Azeri God's Army Cult Members to Stand Trial for Murder”, BBC Monitoring
Central Asia, 25 July 2000.
30 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
thought to have established links to the first Islamists in Chechnya. The
group was originally devised to channel funds to the Afghan jihad, but later
also was heavily involved in Bosnia before it shifted its focus to Chechnya.
In 2002 the U.S. government identified it as a funder of terrorism.
Unlike in Central Asia, the Islamist movements of the North Caucasus have
not developed into clear and visible organizations, but rather as networks of
individuals and sub-groups that are known variously under different names.
Hence the main radical figures are associated variously with entities that are
often known by a variety of names, such as the Islamic International
Peacekeeping Brigade, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, the Riyadus-
Salikhin (Garden of Martyrs) Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of
Chechen Martyrs; in Dagestan the Sharia Jamaat and in Kabardino-Balkaria
Yarmukh.8 These labels are at any rate nevertheless secondary to informal
personal and often clan ties and loyalties to charismatic individuals. Hence
the amorphous character of the threat they pose, and the ease with which
they change shape. For example, the Riyadus-Salikhin group was unknown
when it appeared in the siege of a Moscow theater in 2002.
The key native figure that came to lead the radicals is the notorious Chechen
field commander, former computer engineer and terrorist Shamil Basayev.
Alongside Basayev was a Saudi-born veteran of the Afghan, Tajik, and
Bosnian wars, Samer Bin Saleh Bin Abdullah Al-Swelim, better known by
his nom de guerre, Amir Khattab. Khattab provided the chief linkage between
the radicalized parts of the Chechen resistance and the jihadi international,
including elements associated with Al Qaeda such as the Benevolence
International Foundation. Yet it should be noted that rather than an organic
link between Basayev and Al Qaeda, the North Caucasus radicals have
mainly sought to emulate the tactics and language of their more famous role
model. Khattab was killed in 2002, and his role was taken over by another
Saudi known as Amir Al-Walid (Abd Al-Aziz Bin Ali Bin Said Al Said Al-
Ghamdi).9 Walid was in turn killed in April 2004, leaving a vacuum in terms
8 Gordon M. Hahn, ”The Rise of Islamist Extremism in Kabardino-Balkariya”,
Demokratizatsiya, vol. 13 no. 4, 2005, p. 574.
9 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, “The Killing of Abu Al-Walid and the Russian Policy in
Chechnya”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 5 May 2004.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
31
of contacts with the Arab world. This also took place at the time of
increasing focus on Iraq by militant Islamic groups, further contributing to
pushing Chechen groups into the periphery of the Jihadi international.
Basayev and Khattab controlled areas of southeastern Chechnya in the 1996-
99 inter-war period, and worked incessantly to unite Dagestan and Chechnya
into a joint, Islamic state on the model of the Imamate of Imam Shamil in
the nineteenth century. Hence Basayev organized and led the Islamic Majlis
of Chechnya and Dagestan, an organization devised to be the nucleus of the
joint state. From there, they invaded mountain areas of Dagestan in
September 1999, sparking the second Chechen war.
In Dagestan, meanwhile, Salafi Islam had been spreading steadily since the
arrival of missionaries there in the late 1980s. Several villages (Chabanmakhi,
Karamakhi, and Kadar were seized and controlled by Salafi groups who set
up their local laws and denied Russian or Dagestani authorities control.10
Khattab seized on the opportunity by building links through marriage with
these jamaats and training young men in camps in Chechnya. Even though
the Khattab-Basayev invasion failed and resulted in the debacle of the second
Chechen war, Salafi radicals have continued to exist in Dagestan. Indeed,
just as Moscow gradually managed to reduce the intensity of the war in
Chechnya, the problem has grown worse in Dagestan. The Dagestani rebels
are led by Rabbani Khalilov, an ethnic Lak who married into the same
Dagestani family in Karamakhi that Khattab had married into. Khalilov is
thought to be responsible for a major terrorist attack on a victory parade in
the Dagestani city of Kaspiysk in May 2002. 11 The group reorganized itself as
the “Sharia Jamaat” in early 2005. Presently, the frequency of military clashes
between Islamic fighters and security forces in Dagestan equals or surpasses
the number in Chechnya.12
10 Lorenzo Vidino, “The Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen
Conflict”, AL-Nakhlah, Spring 2006. (Fletcher School Online Journal), p. 4.
11 Paul Tumelty, “Chechnya and the Insurgency in Dagestan”, Chechnya Weekly, vol. 6
no. 18, 11 May 2005.
12 Murad Batal Al-Shishani, “From Grozny To Nalchik: Is the North Caucasus
Heading Back to The Nineteenth Century?”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 October
2005.
32 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
Following the same pattern – young men trained in militant camps in
Chechnya, who then returned to their home republics –militant cells have
been formed also in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-
Cherkessia. The Yarmuk group in Kabardino-Balkaria, which was the main
responsible group for the carnage in the local capital Nalchik in October 2005.
33
Current Issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus and
Implications for Islamic Radicalism
If September 11 and its aftermath brought a strong blow to radical Islamists
in Central Asia and the Caucasus, this was mainly a lull. Since 2004, a series
of events have taken place that indicate that the problem of Islamic
radicalism is not going away. However, it is also apparent from these
developments that the radical groupings are continuously able to alter their
shape, methods and tactics in order to evade attempts by governments to
fight them. In this sense, the regions have come to differ. In the North
Caucasus, the Chechen rebellion gradually morphed into a region-wide
insurgency with Islamist overtones, negating all efforts by Russia to control
the situation. In Central Asia, however, Islamists seem to have drawn
important lessons from the ‘color revolutions’ in Eurasia, and the western
reaction to them.
Uzbekistan, 2004: Terrorism Re-Emerges
In light of the inability of Central Asian governments to deal effectively
with corruption, poverty, and basic governance issues more than ten years
after independence, it is not surprising that the well-organized and focused
ideological work of HT is producing results. Following the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the
Islamists seem to have decided it is also time for them to rise.
Radical Islamist and terrorist activity in Central Asia has increased markedly
since early 2004. Having seen no major terrorist activity since 2000,
Uzbekistan was hit by two waves of terrorist attacks between March 28 and
March 31, including the region’s first ever female suicide bombing. The
attacks, which caused 47 fatalities in total, were aimed primarily at police and
Uzbek private and commercial facilities. A second attack targeted the
American and Israeli embassies as well as the prosecutor general’s office. The
34 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
scale and level of preparation for these attacks suggests strongly that they
received support from outside Uzbekistan. The country’s chief prosecutor
alleged that all 85 individuals (including 17 women) arrested had been trained
as suicide bombers.
Yet another group, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), released a statement
claiming responsibility for the Uzbek attacks, which was followed by the
U.S. State Department’s May 2005 designation of this group (under ten
different names) as a terrorist organization. In the State Department’s
statement, IJG is described as a splinter of the IMU, and is held responsible
for the July 30, 2004 bombing attacks in Tashkent targeting the U.S. and
Israeli Embassies, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General. The State
Department’s designation also called attention to the fact that “those arrested
in connection with the attacks in Bukhara have testified to the close ties
between the IJG leaders and Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.
Kazakhstani authorities have declared that IJG members were taught by al-
Qaida instructors to handle explosives and to organize intelligence work and
subversive activities.”
Despite all this information, most of the attention in the West from the
spring of 2004 onwards was on the Uzbek government’s reaction and not on
the terrorists – even though these attacks were the first major violence in
Uzbekistan since the 2000 insurgency. And despite being in the midst of the
‘war on terror’, the U.S., a self-avowed strategic partner of Uzbekistan,
highlighted the need to improve democracy and human rights while doing
very little to help the Uzbek government in its investigation or its response
to the attacks. Overall, the terrorists were greatly emboldened, concluding
that western opinion would allow them literally to get away with murder.
The Kyrgyz ‘Revolution’, 2005
In November 2004, in Jalal-Abad, where some of the strongest antigovernment
protests took place in March 2005, HT reportedly collected some
20,000 signatures on a petition calling for more Islamic instruction in schools
and segregation of sexes. In the February 2005 parliamentary elections,
candidates who supported this view received backing from HT. While there
was almost no overt Islamist activity during the revolution, the events began
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
35
and gained momentum in the southern part of the country, which is where
HT and other groups have, for several years, been urging people to rise
against poverty, corruption and injustice – all of which were blamed on the
central government.
Following the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, opposition forces in the
Kyrgyz Republic overthrew their government in March 2005. Unlike the
Georgians and the Ukrainians, however, the Kyrgyz opposition used
violence, and in the post-revolutionary period failed to bring stability and
order to the country. Indeed, the March 24 revolution ushered in a period of
chaos, with the new government unable to control the country’s borders or to
bring about internal stability. This risks leading to ever deeper popular
disappointment with secular politics in Kyrgyzstan. Unless the new
government is brought to establish a democratic order and deliver on its
promises, HT and others are certain to gain strength from this growing
disillusionment.
The West’s reaction to the collapse of the Akaev government emboldened
the terrorists even further. They drew three key lessons from the experience:
First, if a revolt were to be framed the right way, i.e. as another ‘color
revolution’ against an oppressive, corrupt regime, neither the US nor the
Europeans would be likely to step in. Second, that the West would, within
limits, also tolerate the use of force, as in the Uzbek attacks the preceding
years. Third, the radicals found that by using the excitement and anticipation
of ‘color revolutions’ among the Western media and the various democracy
and human rights NGOs, they could convince the world that they were the
unalloyed champions of human rights and good governance.
Andijan, 2005: Insurgency, Crackdown, and the Western Reaction
The third significant event of lasting importance to the region took place in
Andijan in May 2005. In fact, Andijan may prove to be a turning point in the
West’s loss of influence in Central Asia and the further strengthening of the
radical groups.
Andijan is close to Osh, where the Kyrgyz uprising began, and even closer to
Jalalabad, where only weeks before the Andijan events the majority Uzbek
population successfully laid armed siege to the provincial government’s
36 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
headquarters. It is also close to Namangan, a center of Salafi activity in
Uzbekistan. In many ways, Andijan is the heart of the Ferghana Valley,
which itself is the heart of Central Asia. Akram Yuldashev realized that
Andijan is the first stop along the path to power in Uzbekistan, which is the
prize of the Islamists because of its geostrategically central location in
Eurasia, and because of its historic and cultural position in the Islamic world.
Its under-government and stagnation is also making it an increasingly easy
target.
In June, 2004, 23 businessmen, followers of Akramiya, were arrested and in
February w005 they were put on trial. Peaceful demonstrations in support of
the defendants went on for several weeks. According to reports from the
region, Akramiya organized the uprising in a carefully planned way: the
accused businessmen promised to pay their staff a full day’s salary if they
attended the protests. Moreover, their relatives organized transport for others
to come from more distant regions. The protesters were orderly and asking
merely for “justice” for their relatives and friends. By May 12th, the
presumed final week of the trial, there were already several thousand
peaceful demonstrators.
That night, the Uzbek government arrested some demonstrators. This arrest
marked the start of the uprising. On the morning of May 13, armed militants
first seized a police station, then a military post, and then a high-security
prison, collecting weaponry in each place and killing officials and others
along the way. Negotiations between the government and the militants broke
down, in part because the release of Akram Yuldashev was the main demand
of the insurgents. Expecting a harsh reaction from the government, the
insurgents then formed human shields with women and children.13 While it
is yet to be determined who shot first, by the end of the day, some two
hundred persons were dead, most killed by government troops but a large
number killed by the armed insurgents.
13 Margarita Assenova, “Uzbekistan is Running Out of Time”, Internationale Politik:
Transatlantic Edition, Fall 2005. See also Igor Rotar, “Uzbekistan: What is Known
About Akramia and the Uprising?”, Forum 18 News Service, 16 June 2005, including the
following quote: “The hostages had wire tied round their necks and were placed at the
perimeter of the square as human shields.”
(http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=586)
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
37
Over a year later, many in the West still do not have a sense of who the
insurgents were. In fact, few have shown much interest in the insurgents,
and instead blamed only the Karimov regime for conducting what was
immediately labeled a massacre of peaceful protestors. As of June 2006, the
number of people killed by both sides is still contested, although the Moscow
Human Rights organization Memorial’s estimate that the total was probably
around 200 will probably prevail. But Western governments were quick to
rush to conclusions, without carefully weighing the evidence and without
seeking detailed knowledge of the mode of operation of groups like HT and
Akramiya. The Uzbek scholar Bakhtiyor Babajanov (who served as a state’s
witness in the trial) interviewed Yuldashev in November 2005 in his prison
cell. During a May 2006 visit to Washington DC, Babajanov stated that
Yuldashev had told him that in a March 2005 article published a month and a
half before the Andijan attacks, he had claimed that Akramiya was in the
process of “waging a jihad against the oppressors and infidels” and stated that
“death in the way of Allah is not death but a return to your Lord”. There is as
yet no independent verification of Babajanov’s claim.
The planners of the Andijan uprising seem to have waited to initiate it until
they felt that the local and international context was right. Specifically, they
seemed to have been inspired by the successful Uzbek uprising in Jalalabad in
the Kyrgyz Republic and also by the subsequent breakdown of civil authority
there.
Following the events in Andijan, western intelligence agencies, governments,
and media did a poor job of seeking and weighing the many conflicting
strands of evidence left by the events. Most simply rushed to whatever
conclusions they were predisposed to reach, attacking those who questioned
them. The overall inability of many analysts to understand how Islamic
radical groups operate is one of the reasons for why the analysis of the
Andijan events has been inadequate. The role of Islamists in the uprising was
generally not recognized, in spite of the fact that the organizers of the
uprising are recorded as shouting religious slogans. On the other hand, it
must be noted that Islamist groups are growing increasingly sophisticated,
focusing on secular slogans that are likely to elicit more positive reactions
internationally.
38 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
It is also important to understand the growing role of women in Islamic
radicalism. The first suicide killings in Central Asia took place in 2005, and
were conducted by women who did not fit the traditional profile of poor,
uneducated and repressed. For example, the 19-year old Dilnoza
Holmuradova and her 22-year old sister Shahnoza Holmuradova came from a
relatively affluent family in Tashkent and were well-educated.14 Dilnoza
reportedly spoke five languages and had attended the police academy. What
seems to have turned them into extremists were the people they met.
According to an interview with their mother, “they began studying Islam in
2002…they began to change a great deal…stopped wearing modern clothes,
listening to music and watching television.” They left home in 2004 and soon
after carried out their attacks.
It is likely that at some vulnerable moment these women made contact with
Islamists, who in turn influenced them ideologically, and led them to become
terrorists. In the future, increasing numbers of women may be used in
terrorist attacks, since they are harder to profile than men and more likely to
slip through security controls. This process has already taken place in the
North Caucasus.
The Long-term impact of Andjian
Sadly, what really happed in Andjian, how many people were killed, and by
whom, has lost much of its relevance. Radical Islamist groups have won the
information war. While the insurgency was an attempted coup d’état,
international media framed the story as the massacre of innocent civilians
comparable to the Tiananmen Square incident. Even some Uzbek dissidents
in exile have deplored the West’s reaction, and called sanctions counterproductive.
15
While many in the West condemned Uzbek President Islam Karimov,
leaders from the Muslim world either remained silent, or, in the case of the
Great Shaykh of Al-Azhar University, Mohammad Sayed Tantawi, focused
14 “Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers,” IWPR, RCA No. 278, (20 April 2004)
15 I.e. former Birlik leader Abdumannob Polat, see “Sanctions Urged on Uzbekistan”,
Washington Times, 17 June 2006; “Can US- Uzbekistan Relationship be Saved”,
Registan.net, http://www.registan.net/?p=6277.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
39
on the threat of a radical takeover. He reportedly stated that the methods and
tactics used by Andijan extremists resemble acts of terrorism in Egypt in
1974, when commandos of Salah Sirriya, the former chief of the military
wing of the Hizb ut-Tahrir division in Egypt, attacked the military
technology institute in an effort to obtain enough weaponry for a coup.
Russia benefited most from the post-Andjian fallout. Russian government
officials have publicly supported the Uzbek government, and declared that
the uprising was planned and carried out by foreign groups wanting to
overthrow the government. With scant evidence, Russia also backed the
government’s claims that about 50 foreigners were detained or killed. It also
noted the ideological similarities with Chechen terrorist groups, citing the
posting on a Chechen website of the IJG’s call for jihad. Following his
meeting with Putin, in Moscow, shortly afterwards, Karimov said that the
attacks were planned from abroad, by mercenaries who “were trained at
military training camps … We have enough facts to prove that the operation
was prepared several months and perhaps several years in advance from
outside Uzbekistan.” Putin backed Karimov and even added that Russians
had information that militants had been crossing from Afghanistan into
Tajiikistan and Uzbekistan prior to the Andijan uprising.
The end result of Andijan is that the U.S. military lost its base in
Uzbekistan, a major setback for essential intelligence and counterterrorism
work. No less significant, the West lost whatever possibility it previously
had to influence the Uzbek government to reform or open up the system. Its
precipitous condemnation of the government’s actions, without
corresponding attention to the insurgents, effectively discredited whatever
reformist currents had existed earlier within the Uzbek government. Instead,
Uzbekistan now leans on Russian and Chinese guidance, which gives carte
blanche to the most repressive forces within the Uzbek government. Indeed,
the pro-Western liberal forces that had slowly strengthened their positions
within the Uzbek elite over that past decade have now been almost
completely purged and marginalized.
Another consequence of Andijan is the flight of hundreds of people who are
seeking refuge in various parts of Central Asia. The question is whether
these are all indeed innocent civilians, or whether there are radical Islamists
40 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
among them, something that interviewers have not been trained to identify.
Many of these refugees sought refuge in the Kyrgyz Republic (and some in
Tajkistan), as did many Uzbek Islamists, who for years have been fleeing the
repression at home to operate in a more open neighboring country. In fact, it
is believed that the Central Asian HT leadership is based in the Kyrgyz city
of Karasu, which has a large ethnic Uzbek population.
There have been numerous reports of Uzbek militants trained in
Afghanistan and Pakistan going back to Uzbekistan. The militants are using
networks of terrorists, criminals, as well as Islamist sympathizers to cross
borders, traveling either via Tajikistan or Iran. Former IMU members have
identified Mashhad, Iran’s second largest city, as the transit center for Uzbek
militants. In this context, the May 2006 incursion of militants from
Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region is worrisome. Armed men attacked
a border post killing several guards, before seizing a stockpile of weapons and
killing additional people while crossing into the Kyrgyz Republic. It is surely
not accidental that the site of these events lies astride an important and
contested drug route. These events were reminiscent of a January 2006
incident, when militants raided a Tajik prison, killed the warden, and freed a
prisoner with alleged IMU ties. It is clear that numbers of heavily armed
people are operating in and around the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. It is less clear who these are, given the interaction of organized
crime and radicalism, and whether they have any links with the Andijan
uprising. Government officials in all three countries seem to be confused,
variously blaming different radical groups, but in all likelihood simply do not
know who they are.
Azerbaijan
Compared to Central Asia, the situation in Azerbaijan is rather calm. Thanks
to its location, Azerbaijan is more open to influences from the West and its
people much better off economically. This is partly due to the relatively
small size of the country and the increased amount of money becoming
available following oil and gas related developments. President Ilham Aliyev
has also pursued careful, pragmatic and evolutionary policies and is more
popular than any of his opponents – secular or Islamic.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
41
That said, it is widely known that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively
trying to spread their Islamist views to Azerbaijan, building new mosques,
and supplying local imams with radical Islamist literature. But they have so
far failed to make much headway. Groups like HT also have not found a
fertile ground in Azerbaijan, in part due to Azerbaijan’s exposure to the West
and close ties to Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish model of a democratic,
secular, pro-Western vision is a commonly shared one by the majority of the
Azerbaijanis. They are also closer to Israel than Iran, which not only sided
with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also challenges
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea.
While there is little support for radicalism inside Azerbaijan, the country
itself is a target for terrorists, precisely because it is a secular democratic
country where Sunnis and Shi’ites live together peacefully. There have been
several rounds of arrests of people who targeted the U.S. embassy and other
strategic allocations.
Radicalization and Insurgency in the North Caucasus
The spread of Islamic radicalism across the North Caucasus has been
advancing steadily in the past several years. This has been exacerbated by
Russian policies of extreme centralization, which have brought increased
amounts of repression to the region since 2002. To that is added the
dislocation of entrenched government elites and the appointment of
politicians loyal to Moscow without strong grounding in the region to lead
the republics of the North Caucasus. The alienation of the population has
progressively increased, and Russia’s failure to resolve the socio-economic
situation in the North Caucasus in spite of its newly found oil wealth is
making matters worse.
Yet the radicalization of Islamist groups in the North Caucasus is mainly a
result of the lingering ulcer in the region, the conflict in Chechnya. The
emergence of the militant cells in the other republics of the region follows a
general pattern: they are typically formed by a small number of individuals
that have fought in Chechnya and received training by militants linked to
Chechen radicalized formations, led by Shamil Basayev and in the past also
by the Arab leaders in the Chechen Jihad, Al-Khattab and Abu Al-Walid.
42 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
They are then sent back to their home republics, where they silently
developed a greater following by recruiting young and disaffected members.
Young and frustrated men without jobs or prospects for either creating a
family or self-realization are then further alienated from the political
leadership of their republic, and attracted to the radical message of the
Islamic jamaats. In this way, the local militant groups have been able to grow
and multiply. Clearly, they still form a small minority of the population, yet
the mismanagement by the region of the federal and republican authorities
demonstrably increases the number of people either willing to or considering
taking up arms against the government.16 In particular, the Russian policy of
assassinating moderate Chechen separatist leaders is gradually leaving the
playing field in the hands of the radical groups. The murder of Aslan
Maskhadov, Chechnya’s legitimate president, in 2005 was followed by the
murder of his successor, Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, in June 2006. His successor
in turn, Doku Umarov, appointed Shamil Basayev as Vice President and his
successor should he be killed as well. Whether by design or by accident,
Moscow is ensuring that there are no moderate Chechen leaders left to
negotiate with, while the radicals’ control over the resistance in the North
Caucasus becomes cemented.
16 See the report written in parallel to this one, Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick
Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Washington and Uppsala: Silk Road Paper,
June 2006, for a detailed discussion.
43
The Sociology and Economics of Islamic Radicalism
Many facile claims have been advanced about the social profile of radical
Islamists in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since these claims have also
served as justification for western policies on the issue, it is some importance
to “get right” the social and economic dimensions of the phenomenon.
The Sociology of Radicalization
Various explanations have been advanced to explain the development and
spread of Islamic radical ideologies. These have centered around economic as
well as political explanations, or the class origins of the militants. Yet these
hypotheses offer at best a partial and insufficient explanation.
Socio-Economic Factors
In the West, the most frequently repeated claim regarding the social profile
of radical Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia is that they come from
the post-Soviet poor of the region. The fact that the North Caucasus is
among the most impoverished regions of Russia and the Ferghana Valley a
relatively poor region of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic,
would seem to support this hypothesis. On this basis, all four governments
are criticized for their failure to create economic opportunity in these zones
of poverty, and generally to embrace reform.
It is undeniable that governments have failed to alleviate poverty in these
and other areas in which Islamists have found a welcome. Yet poverty per se
can scarcely be seen as the incubator of Muslim extremism. Andijan, for
example, with its large Daewoo factory and international tennis center, is far
more prosperous than most neighboring towns. Moreover, the Uzbek city of
Khojent in Tajikistan is far poorer than any city in either Uzbek or Kyrgyz
parts of the Ferghana Valley yet has not generated the same level of
extremism. This does not exonerate governments from the duty to address
44 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
issues of poverty, but it should not be assumed that, in doing so, they will
also remove the cause of extremism.
The fact is that of those Islamists whose social profile is known (mainly on
the basis of evidence brought forward in trials) the overwhelming majority
are not poor, and are in fact drawn from middle class backgrounds or higher.
This is, of course, the case with many Islamic movements elsewhere.
The Class Origins of Militants
A second widely cited hypothesis focuses on the middle or upper middle class
origins of many of the leaders of the extremist movements, and on their
education in the technical fields. Drawing mainly on the experience of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and also on the Saudi leaders of al Qaeda, it is
frequently claimed that radical Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia
are drawn mainly from the technical intelligentsia, and even from the elite of
that group. This hypothesis in turn leads to several possible corollaries. One
faults the cultural vacuum created by Soviet-style technical education, with
its absence of humanistic learning and values. Another criticizes the states
for training young men for jobs that do not exist, leaving them in a
professional limbo from which Islamism becomes a plausible avenue of
escape.
The trouble with this hypothesis is not that it is false but that it explains too
little. It is undeniably true, for example, that most identified Islamists have
had technical training. But so have many others. The Soviet-type educational
system that still prevails across the region one-sidedly focuses on technical
fields, at the expense of the humanities. Thus, nearly of all those who
advance through secondary school and beyond are of the technical
intelligentsia. Yet only a tiny fraction of these have found their way into the
radical Islamists’ camp.
Political Participation and Repression
A much-touted hypothesis, often advanced in both Central Asia and the
West, is that repression and authoritarian rule is a direct cause of Islamic
radicalism. With avenues of political activity closed, the assumption goes,
frustrated opposition-minded young individuals are driven into the arms of
radical groups that form the only possible avenue for political activity. There
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
45
is some merit to this hypothesis, as the prohibition of moderate and secular
forms of opposition leaves the playing field open to radical groups. Yet
neither in Central Asia nor globally does the growth of Islamic radicalism
seem to be correlated with levels of repression. Uzbekistan’s Ferghana valley
was affected by determined Islamic radical movements in the early 1990s, and
their presence formed a cause of Karimov’s repressive policies toward
political opposition rather than being a consequence thereof. Meanwhile,
southern Kyrgyzstan – a relatively liberal political atmosphere – has seen a
growth of radicalism in the past few years comparable to that in Uzbekistan.
Outside Central Asia, the picture is similar: radical groups prosper not only
in repressive societies such as Egypt or Syria; their performance has been
even stronger in Pakistan, where the state, far from being repressive, long
followed a policy of appeasement toward radical groups. Moreover, a major
element in radical Islamic recruiting is what French researcher Olivier Roy
terms ‘Euro-Islam’ – the Islamic communities of western Europe. In global
perspective, Turkey seems to be a successful balance: a political atmosphere
that is generally liberal, but a state that simultaneously understands the
dangers of Islamic radicalism and that draws clear lines in the sand to
prevent radical groups from emerging and threatening secularism. These
examples show that it may not necessarily be repressive political systems as
such that lead to a radical backlash, but the relative deprivation and
alienation of specific communities.
Even this brief overview shows the difficulty in tracing radical Islamism to
simple issues of class, economic deprivation, or political systems. Why do
some follow this path, but not most others? It is worth noting that no single
explanation covers more than a portion of the known Islamists. Because of
this, we are reduced to citing multiple factors that occur with enough
frequency to draw attention.
Vendettas and Relative Deprivation
First among these are personal vendettas against a political leader, whether at
the national or local level. These may have arisen from the official’s
perceived mistreatment of the future Islamists or a relative of his. While
statistical evidence is lacking (this type of information is obviously
suppressed in state trials), it is probable that this is the single most common
46 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
factor leading to radicalization. But unlike Sicily, where a vendetta culture
leads to personal retribution against individuals, in the Caucasus and Central
Asia the reaction is more often focused on the “system” and its local
defenders.
Closely related is the sense among rising members of a regional intelligentsia
that their province lacks real power in the capital. This feeling unites such
otherwise disparate groups as Ferghana Valley residents of both Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan, Chechens and Ingush in the North Caucasus, and even the
Pashtuns in post-Taliban Afghanistan down to 2005. To speak only of the
Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, this region has been systematically excluded
from national power for all but three years over the past four decades. Some
have claimed that the radicalization of the Ferghana Valley traces to old
traditions of religiosity. But these are equally developed in Bukhara and
Samarkand, yet these centers have not produced radical Islamists in
numbers. It is relevant that these cities are far more closely linked with
national power centers than is the Ferghana region.
The “Drugs-Crime-Radical Islamist Nexus.”
A third specific element concerns links with drug traffickers and criminal
groups in general. It is not clear the extent to which this is cause or effect
but the close tie between the more violent Islamist groups and organized
crime has been undeniable from the time the IMU emerged as a major drug
dealing enterprise. Indeed, in this sense Central Asia and the Caucasus are
examples of a worldwide trend, the increasing involvement of violent groups
in organized crime, particularly the drug trade. In fact, the traditional
division of non-state armed groups into mutually exclusive ideal types – the
ideological and the criminal – is an increasingly misleading description of
most armed groups today. A criminal element is increasingly visible in the
financing of most groups, but also in the motivations of many. This fusion of
crime and terrorism or insurgency can be most clearly seen as regards the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and certain formations in the North
Caucasus. For some of these groups, it is unclear whether they are mainly
driven by ideological zeal or by criminal pursuits.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
47
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Though the IMU incursions of 1999 and 2000 were ostensibly waged in the
name of the creation of a Caliphate with a base in the Ferghana valley, a
strong body of evidence suggests they are in fact best explained by more
mundane motivations, especially the drug trade. The geographical areas
targeted, the timing of the attacks, as well as the tactics used, all point in this
direction.
Rising Afghan opium production in the late 1990s led to increasing smuggling
into Central Asia. This in turn led traffickers to seek out new smuggling
routes. A new important route crossed the Tajik-Kyrgyz border from
Tajikistan’s Garm province.17 The Jirgatal and Tavildara areas of Tajikistan
had been IMU strongholds during the civil war, and the IMU used these
areas as a base from which to launch two armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan
in 1999 and 2000. IMU militants established routes for crossing the border
with the help of “drug barons” in Kyrgyzstan’s Osh region.18 The
geographical overlap in the late 1990s of the IMU’s camps and activities with
the main areas of drug trafficking into Kyrgyzstan point at a symbiosis
between the group and drug trafficking networks. Yet other evidence shows
that the IMU was in fact a leading actor in the drug trade in its own right. It
had well-established links with the Taliban government and Al Qaeda,19
while maintaining close contacts with old comrades-in-arms in the former
Tajik opposition, who were now in government, and in turn had close links
with the ethnic Tajik-led Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Only the IMU
had a network of contacts on all sides of the Afghan conflict, which enabled
it to freely move across Afghanistan and Tajikistan unlike any other known
organization.
17 See Maral Madi, ““Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan”, Structure, Implications, and
Countermeasures”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 23 no. 3-4, December 2004.
18 Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, “The Development of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (Turkestan)”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University,
2003.
19 See eg. Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extermism,
Sandhurst: United Kingdom Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Report no. K39, March 2003, pp. 9-10.
48 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
The IMU’s insurgencies into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were in the form
of simultaneous but small-scale incursions by comparatively small groups of
fighters. This makes little military sense as the IMU could neither hope to
defeat government forces nor to trigger an uprising that way. However,
considered as a diversionary measure intended to create instability, confuse
law enforcement and military structures, and gain access to mountain passes
for trafficking, the incursions make perfect sense.20
There is a significant consensus that the IMU was strongly involved in drug
trafficking from Afghanistan toward Osh in Kyrgyzstan, where opiates are
handed to trafficking networks that ship them further north and west. Drug
control experts concurred with the estimate that the IMU controlled up to
two thirds of opiates entering the Kyrgyz Republic.21 Interpol labeled the
IMU “a hybrid organization in which criminal interests often take priority
over ‘political’ goals”, whose “leaders have a vested interest in ongoing unrest
and instability in their area in order to secure the routes they use for the
transportation of drugs.”22 Kyrgyz government officials noted that the
volume of drugs trafficked into Kyrgyzstan increased significantly after the
1999 incursion.23
This does not mean, however, that the IMU completely jettisoned its
religious ideology. In fact, the IMU was not a monolithic organization. Most
studies of the movement indicate the coexistence of a more guerrilla-oriented
20 Makarenko, “Traffickers Turn from Balkan Conduit to 'Northern' Route”; Madi, p.
7.
21 Personal communications from international drug control officials, Washington,
May 2001; Tamara Makarenko, ‘Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia’, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, July 2000.
22 Ralf Mutschke, “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs
Trafficking and Terrorism”, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime of the
Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 December 2000. Also
testimony to the same hearing of Donnie R. Marshall, Drug Enforcement
Administration administrator, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/00121301.htm.
23 Bolot Januzakov, quoted in Glenn E. Curtis, “Involvement of Russian Organized
Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist
Groupings in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya”,
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, October 2002, p.
14.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
49
and criminal faction and a more religious one within the group.24 As such,
different actions attributed to the IMU were likely caused by different
motivations. The IMU is best understood as an amalgam of personal
vendetta, Islamism, drugs, geopolitics, and terrorism.
Chechen Armed Groups
Since the late 1980s, there have been strong connections between the Chechen
separatist movement and Chechen organized crime, and this has evolved into
the involvement of various types of Chechen militant groups and organized
crime. Much like other Caucasian peoples, the Chechens were wellrepresented
in Soviet-era organized crime. But as the conflict developed,
militants in Chechnya increasingly appropriated the ability to directly
engage in criminal activities instead of allying with criminal groups. This
was partly related to changes on the field, with Chechen groupings becoming
smaller in size and less centrally coordinated. Meanwhile, the North
Caucasus became an increasingly prominent smuggling route for drugs,
arms, people, and various commodities. Chechnya’s position as a territory
outside Russian jurisdiction also attracted criminal interests in the early
1990s, including prominent Russian figures who needed this free-trade zone.
In the 1996-99 inter-war period, Chechnya was threatened by economic
collapse as reconstruction funds were stolen and diverted in Moscow before
they reached Chechnya.25 This further increased incentives among
decommissioned troops to engage in crime, given the absence of other
economic alternatives.
In the second war, Chechen groupings experienced increasing financial
problems. The first to be hit were the secular, moderate leadership which
lacked wealthy patrons abroad. Yet the radical groups, led by Shamil Basayev
and Ibn ul-Khattab, benefited from a steady flow of funds from the Middle
East. This has nevertheless changed. Growing international measures to curb
terrorist funding after 9/11 were followed by the killing of Khattab, who had
been the main channel of funding. Subsequently, the Iraq war diverted the
attention of the ‘sponsors’ of the Chechen Islamic resistance, contributing
24 Makarenko, “Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade”.
25 President Boris Yeltsin’s famous quote in this connection is ”only the devil knows
where that money went”.
50 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
further to isolating Chechnya. As a result, the Chechen rebel groups have
had increasing a incentives to turn to organized crime for their financing.
Near Chechnya, Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge became a center of drug trafficking
when now deceased Chechen warlord Ruslan Gelayev was in the valley in
1999-2002. Likewise, it is believed that Shamil Basayev ran narcotics
operations between the two wars with his brother Shirvani Basayev, which
may very well have been taken up again.
The war in Chechnya has gradually been criminalized, on both sides of the
conflict: the Russian military and internal forces in Chechnya are known to
be plagued by widespread corruption at all levels, not least among the top
brass, which profits from involvement in the smuggling of oil products and
other commodities. This is the background against which the conflict has in
many ways changed from a war to a criminal operation. Vested interests on
both sides of the divide profit from the conflict through criminal
involvement; and moreover, Chechen and Russian armed groups are known
to cooperate in criminal operations. This is facilitated by the fragmentation
of forces on both sides: Russia has successfully fragmented the hierarchical
structure of the Chechen resistance, leading to smaller units dependent on
crime for their survival, with no one to rein in wayward commanders. On
the Russian side, there is little coordination between troops loyal to the pro-
Russian Chechen government; the army; the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
the Federal Security Service; the border patrol forces; or the military
intelligence. Hence various Chechen groups may cooperate in smuggling
with one Russian formation while actively fighting another, and vice versa.
This includes Islamic radical groups. An excellent example is the late Arbi
Barayev, one of the most brutal and criminalized Chechen field commanders
with an Islamist leaning, and one of the most wanted men in Russia. As
Anna Politkovskaya reported, Barayev was able to live calmly in a luxury
villa a few miles from a Russian checkpoint, with an FSB sticker on his car
allowing him free travel across Chechnya.
These examples show the complex nature of radical Islamic groups in the
region, and in particular the violent formations. Socio-economic conditions,
political systems, external influences, and crime are all factors that contribute
to the development of radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and the
Caucasus.
51
How Should the EU Respond?
The prospects of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus remain
unclear. On the one hand, it is evident that radical groups do not have strong
following in local societies. In spite of repression, poverty, and foreign
proselytizing, only a minority of the population of the region appears to find
the message of the radicals appealing. What is worrying, though, is that this
message appears increasingly tempting to segments of the youth in the
region. This does not appear to be related to levels of economic development
or the openness of political systems. Indeed, if radical groups are finding an
attentive audience amidst the poverty and repression of the North Caucasus,
they have shown equal skill at attracting the relatively well-to-do middleclass
youth that flock around Baku’s Abu Bakr mosque, or among
businessmen in Andijan.
The regional scene is also far from positive. The insurgency in along
Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan has grown again, and Western countries
have shown a disturbing inability to deal with the ideological element of the
war on terror. Aside from the energy-rich countries such as Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, the region’s governments are failing to meet their citizens’ basic
socio-economic needs. All this fosters and environment in which Islamic
radical groups can thrive. Islamist and terrorist organizations have also
shown an ability to modify their tactics and increasingly cooperate with one
other – based on the needs of local conditions. For example, HT distributed
free meals and toys during the last Islamic holiday in Kyrgyzstan, in spite of
never having done any social work before. It is therefore essential to
regularly review assumptions and analyses as the radical groups are
constantly adopting their tactics based on changing conditions on the ground.
Meanwhile, western influence in Central Asia has been decreasing rapidly,
and is non-existent in the North Caucasus. Only Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
52 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
can be said to be increasingly linked with the western realm. With the West
more or less out of the picture, and Russian and Chinese influence growing,
the Central Asian governments are likely to become more repressive and less
reformist. Thus, the regional environment is moving in a direction where the
worst authoritarian tendencies of the local governments will come out, while
it will do little to improve the economic conditions. This will make the
Islamist message of injustice increasingly appealing, and help the Islamists to
grow stronger. In comparison, the carrots that the EU and the U.S. can offer
the Central Asian governments will not be attractive enough, while the
sticks that the West can use will not be painful enough to induce change.
If this general situation is less than rosy, there are indeed areas where the
West in general and the EU in particular can be effective.
● First and foremost, it is crucial to develop skills, especially in the
intelligence community, in understanding the ideological framework of the
radical and terrorist groups. Unless this happens, even if there is increased
human intelligence capacity (which is also needed), western governments
will continue to be unable to put the information into the right context.
● As the preceding discussion has shown, the radical and externally
sponsored Islamic movements and organizations existing in the region offer
little hope for a meaningful dialogue. Even if they were prepared to engage in
such dialogue with the West (for which there is no evidence), it would
constitute a gross breach of normal diplomatic relations with countries of the
region. The moderate majority is less organized and much weaker
financially. However, it is quite possible to engage representatives of this
majority, and also of the secular parts of the population, in dialogue. This
could prove useful and should be pursued.
● In seeking to foster more constructive approaches within the region,
the West needs to support reform-minded officials within governments, not
just anti-government forces. Unfortunately, some recent EU policies have
indiscriminately hounded the same reformers who are being punished by
their own governments. To move beyond this situation will require a much
higher quality of information than the EU states now command. Such
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
53
information must focus on informal groupings and networks within the
governments as well as groups outside.
European governments and the various NGOs are today perceived in the
region as exclusively supporting the opposition, with strongly counterproductive
effect. Especially since the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia and
Ukraine and the overthrow of the Akaev government in the Kyrgyz
Republic, Central Asian leaders were convinced that both the U.S. and the
EU sought to oust them from office. Segments of the mainstream public
appear to agree with them. This in turn led to deteriorating relations and the
closure of NGOs. It is important to change this perception, to be able to
invest in internal change and to provide political space for reformers and
NGOs to function properly. For that, the EU, together with the U.S., needs
to find points for collaboration within the governments. It must quietly and
deftly support progressive groups within the system and work patiently but
tenaciously toward evolutionary change. This will lay the foundation for a
new generation of pro-democratic, tolerant, and competent leaders who
provide alternatives both to the current leaders and to the Islamists who raise
the banner of radical change.
● The link between drug trafficking and religious extremism is proven
beyond doubt. While most drug traffickers may have no connection to
religious extremism, those who do are sufficiently important to provide a
steady income stream for Islamic militant and terrorist groups. The drug
trade in Afghanistan and Central Asia is demand-driven, with the majority
of the demand arising from EU member countries. The one action by the EU
that would do most to address the problem of religious extremism in the
region would be to lend major financial support to counter-narcotics efforts.
Such support must be commensurate with the huge European demand that
sustains the industry and, indirectly, much of the extremism.
● Beyond this, the EU should understand that the expansion of
continental trade across Central Asia and the Caucasus (i.e. trade involving
Europe, China, India, and the Mediterranean) is likely to be the single most
powerful and positive engine of change in the coming years. As roads,
railroads, pipelines, and electric lines increasingly link the region to the great
economic centers of Eurasia, local populations will be drawn out of the
54 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr & Svante E. Cornell
isolation that breeds extremism, and into a larger multi-cultural mainstream.
The EU should understand that in promoting continental trade, it is bringing
these regions into the larger world, and opening to them opportunities that
do not exist at present.
● Related to this increasing economic engagement with Europe and with
other Eurasian economic centers, is the value that comes from educational
and cultural exchange. EU educational exchanges should be moved out of
the exclusive control of the capital cities and the national elites, and extended
to the provinces, including those now experiencing Islamic radical
movements. The presence of a few dozen young men and women with
cosmopolitan outlooks in such places can open prospects to thousands of
others. Significantly, they can also be a source of future leaders at the
regional level. Educational exchange is a productive and cost-effective means
of fighting sectarian extremism.
● In dealing with governments throughout the region, the EU should
focus on the delivery of governmental services to “deprived” areas, and in
general, on greater degrees of decentralization and self-government, which is
essential to reintegrate alienated regions to national polities, and also to
providing social and economic prospects for their citizens. To be effective,
such programs must receive the support and cooperation of the central
governments, without therefore being allowed to slip into cooptation by
central ministries. Striking a deft balance in this regard could allow the EU
to present itself as a credible champion of civic improvement without cutting
off its access the governments whose performance it seeks to improve
● Further, the EU should treat the issue of support for extremism in
Central Asia (including Afghanistan) and the Caucasus as a subject for
bilateral discussion with relevant Arab states and Iran. The governments of
Central Asia and the Caucasus all know full well that extremist movements
receive support from abroad. If the EU, with its extensive ties with the
countries in question, fails to include this matter in its bilateral talks with
them, it will be signaling to the Caucasus and Central Asia that the EU’s
priorities lie elsewhere.
Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU
55
● On dealing with religious radicalism and government repression, the
EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is relevant to
understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and open
democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and
militant Islamic political ideology. Eurasia’s Muslim majorities countries
that want to maintain their secular regime, will not listen to naïve
suggestions from Western countries that have never dealt with the holistic
nature of Islam. They will, however, listen to advice on creating the right
legal and constitutional safety nets so that radical groups, or “sleeper cells,”
cannot take over secular systems. To this end, the EU should engage Turkey
as it addresses issues of radical Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Besides underscoring a common interest between Turkey and the EU, this
would bring benefit in the form of better focused initiatives on the EU’s part,
and even possibly to initiatives that are coordinated between the EU and
Turkey.