The
last week of November 2012 was a big one on the Israeli-Palestinian
front. On the 65th anniversary of the partition resolution that created a
Jewish state, the United Nations recognized a Palestinian one. Israel
retaliated with the West Bank equivalent of sequestration: announcing it
would move toward building settlements in an area east of Jerusalem
called E1, which many observers believe would kill the two-state solution. European governments responded by threatening to withdraw
their ambassadors.
And
the United States? It mostly watched. In 2011, when the Palestinians
first sought a U.N. status upgrade, the Obama diplomatic corps lobbied
so hard against it that one State Department official joked that
“sometimes I feel like I work for the Israeli government.” This time, by
contrast, the U.S. largely went through the motions. It was
“half-assed,” observes a Middle East insider close to the
administration. “They didn’t really lobby hard ... [The attitude was] if
Israel ends up with a big embarrassment, who gives a s--t.”
Then,
when Israel responded by going nuclear on settlements and the Europeans
responded with fury, the administration was similarly passive. Contrary
to reports in the Israeli press, Team Obama didn’t mastermind the angry
European response. But neither did they tamp it down. Even though E1
has long been an American red line. And even though the Israelis alerted
the White House mere hours before they announced the decision, the
Obama administration’s response was pro forma and bland. Publicly, Obama
himself said nothing. It was the first sign of what senior
administration officials predict may be a new approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Obama’s second term: benign neglect.
Consider the view from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. On the one hand,
Benjamin Netanyahu keeps doing things—like expanding settlements and
refusing to accept the 1967 lines as the parameters for peace talks—that
U.S. officials consider bad for America and catastrophic for Israel. On
the other, every time President Obama has tried to make Netanyahu
change course—in 2009 when he demanded a settlement freeze and in 2011
when he set parameters for peace talks—the White House has been
politically clobbered. Administration officials might like to
orchestrate Netanyahu’s defeat in next month’s Israeli elections, as
Bill Clinton did when he sent political consultants to convince Israelis
to replace Netanyahu with Ehud Barak in 1999. But they can’t because
Netanyahu has no serious rivals for power. Former prime minister Ehud
Olmert isn’t running; the centrist party he once led, Kadima, has
largely collapsed, and the head of the center-left Labor Party is
advertising her willingness to be a junior partner in another Netanyahu
government.
So
instead of confronting Netanyahu directly, Team Obama has hit upon a
different strategy: stand back and let the rest of the world do the
confronting. Once America stops trying to save Israel from the
consequences of its actions, the logic goes, and once Israel feels the
full brunt of its mounting international isolation, its leaders will be
scared into changing course. “The tide of global opinion is moving
[against Israel],” notes one senior administration official. And in that
environment, America’s “standing back” is actually “doing something.”
Administration
officials are quick to note that this new approach does not mean
America won’t help protect Israel militarily through anti-missile
defense systems like the much-heralded Iron Dome. And they add that the
U.S. will strongly resist any Palestinian effort to use its newfound
U.N. status to bring lawsuits against Israel at the International
Criminal Court. America will also try to prevent further spasms of
violence: by maintaining the funding that keeps Mahmoud Abbas afloat in
the West Bank and by working with Egypt to restrain Hamas.
What
America won’t do, however, unless events on the ground dramatically
change, is appoint a big-name envoy (some have suggested Bill Clinton)
to relaunch direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The
reason: such negotiations would let Netanyahu off the hook. Senior
administration officials believe the Israeli leader has no interest in
the wrenching compromises necessary to birth a viable Palestinian state.
Instead, they believe, he wants the façade of a peace process because
it insulates him from international pressure. By refusing to make that
charade possible, Obama officials believe, they are forcing Netanyahu to
own his rejectionism, and letting an angry world take it from there.
To
some outside observers, it all sounds too clever by half. Daniel
Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, notes that as
long as the administration still protects Israel from prosecution at the
International Criminal Court, Netanyahu won’t suffer enough
internationally to reconsider his ways. Others are harsher, suggesting
that behind the administration’s supposed strategic jujitsu lies
cowardice: a fear of confronting Netanyahu and his American allies. One
problem with outsourcing the job of pressuring Israel to Europe, they
note, is that since many Israelis already doubt Europe’s affection for
the Jewish state, that pressure may not hurt Netanyahu domestically. It
could even strengthen him.
Read the full story here.
Read the full story here.
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